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PICTURING TAKINGS 
 
Lee Anne Fennell
*
 
 
Takings doctrine, we are constantly reminded, is unclear to 
the point of incoherence.  The task of finding our way 
through it has become more difficult, and yet more 
interesting, with the Supreme Court’s recent, inconclusive 
foray into the arena of judicial takings in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment.  Following guideposts in Kelo, Lingle, and 
earlier cases, this essay uses a series of simple diagrams to 
examine how elements of takings jurisprudence fit together 
with each other and with other limits on governmental 
action.  Visualizing takings in this manner yields surprising 
lessons for judicial takings and for takings law more 
generally.       
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment1 
intrigued and unsettled legal commentators by raising, but not resolving, the 
question of judicial takings.
2
  Like Kelo
3
 before it, the case has prompted a 
                                                 
* Max Pam Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  I thank Joanna Shepherd Bailey, 
Benjamin Barros, Eric Biber, Mark Fenster, William Hubbard, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, 
Eduardo Peñalver, Ariel Porat, Julie Roin, Lior Strahilevitz, and participants in faculty workshops at Emory 
School of Law, Seton Hall Law School, and the University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. I am also grateful to the students in my Spring 2011 Tragedies and Takings seminar, whose 
thoughtful feedback on my chalkboard attempts at depicting the field of takings helped to launch this project.  
1 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. __;  130 
S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
2 See text accompanying notes 97-100 for an overview of the judicial taking question and the Court’s 
decision in Stop the Beach.  A great deal of scholarship and commentary has already have been produced on Stop 
the Beach during its short life, and many more contributions are doubtless underway.  See, e.g., Eduardo M.  
Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 97 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), draft on file with author; Amnon 
Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), draft available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788242; D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 RICH. L. REV. 
903 (2011) ; Symposium, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Essay Reflections from the Amicus Curiae, 35 VT L. 
REV., no. 2 (2010); Symposium, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (2011); Symposium, Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. (2011). A classic 
article on judicial takings that long predates the current academic flurry is Barton Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 
VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990). 
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resurgence of scholarly interest in takings.  And, like the less famous but 
equally important Lingle v. Chevron,
4
 it implicates important questions 
about the scope and bounds of the Takings Clause. Property scholars and 
students now face fresh challenges in understanding how  different elements 
of takings jurisprudence fit together with each other and with other 
limitations on governmental power. In puzzling through this set of 
questions, I found myself turning again and again to iterative graphical 
representations.  These pictures soon became more than just a way to pin 
down what I thought I knew about takings.  Rather, they turned into 
vehicles for asking new questions and for seeing aspects of the takings 
field—including, but not limited to, the question of judicial takings—from 
new angles.   
This essay, written around a series of simple diagrams, proceeds in three 
steps.  Part I provides a visual primer on (nonjudicial) takings law that lays 
the groundwork for what follows.  Part II introduces some puzzles about 
wrongs and remedies, again sticking with legislative and administrative 
takings. Part III examines the implications of this analysis for judicial 
takings.  
The diagrammatic approach pursued here illuminates three 
underappreciated features of takings law that can help fit judicial takings 
into the existing doctrinal framework. First, it draws attention to the two 
distinct doctrinal boundaries implicated in takings law and the ways that 
institutional competencies influence the strategies for policing them. 
Second, it emphasizes a category of confiscatory acts that are not deemed to 
be takings. Third, it highlights the fact that traditional takings law slots 
governmental acts into three “zones”—dubbed here the “free zone,” the 
“pay zone,” and the “no-go zone”—a taxonomy that suggests a fourth 
possibility,
5
 and one that turns out to have interesting implications for 
judicial takings. I show (without endorsing) how these features could 
plausibly combine to render judicial takings a nearly null set, occupying 
even less conceptual space than the set of legislative or administrative 
takings that flunk the Supreme Court’s public use test.   
This is an essay about the architecture of takings doctrines and the 
limiting principles built into their structure, not an effort to explicate or 
advocate a new theory of takings, judicial or otherwise. My goal throughout 
is analytic rather than normative. I start with takings doctrines as they 
currently exist, try to find the best conceptual and diagrammatic 
                                                                                                                            
3 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
4 Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).    
5 This follows, of course, from the famous four-rule taxonomy set out in Guido Calabresi & Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Alienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 
(1972).  The way in which this taxonomy maps onto eminent domain has been discussed in, for example, Carol 
M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral,  106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2180-81 (1997).  See Part III.D, infra for discussion 
and an alternative approach.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023615
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characterization of them, and then see where judicial takings might fit into 
the story.   
 
I.  MAPPING (NONJUDICIAL)TAKINGS 
 
Setting aside the enticing topic of judicial takings for the moment, we 
can begin with takings doctrine as it has been applied to actions emanating 
from the legislative and executive branches, which I will refer to in this 
essay collectively as “nonjudicial” takings. 
 
A.    Three Zones 
 
Our story starts simply enough. There are some things that the 
government
6
 can do, and other things it is prohibited from doing.  For now, 
we need not worry about why it cannot do the things it cannot do, or how 
we can tell whether a given act lies inside or outside the realm of legitimate 
government action.  We need only assume that there are some fixed limits 
on government action.  That lets us define an area within which the 
government may act if it so chooses, as shown in Slide 1.  
 
Slide 1 
 
 
 
 
We can then identify the surrounding space as the realm of impermissible 
                                                 
6 My focus in this Part is on governmental actors in the political branches.  Different actors within these 
branches will face different constraints on their action; I will reference these differences to the extent they become 
relevant to the analysis. 
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governmental acts.  
Now we can start to think about “takings.”  The Takings Clause in the 
U.S. Constitution reads: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”7  The category of “takings” includes exercises 
of eminent domain (where the government admits it is engaging in a taking) 
as well as certain other physical and regulatory incursions that are found to 
rise to the level of a taking.
8
 The doctrines are complex, but the universe of 
“takings” can nonetheless be represented by Slide 2’s simple square. 
   
Slide 2 
 
 
 
 
Next, we must consider how this square of governmental takings 
intersects with the respective realms of legitimate and impermissible 
government actions depicted in Slide 1.  That relationship is illustrated in 
Slide 3. 
 
                                                 
7 U.S. Const., Amend. V.  The Takings Clause is made applicable to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment.  Additionally, nearly all state constitutions contain their own Takings Clauses.  
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1061 n.2 (7th ed. 2010) 
8 See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text. 
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Slide 3 
 
 
 
 
As this intersection suggests, a governmental “taking” may or may not 
be a legitimate governmental act.  In order for it to be legitimate, two 
criteria must be met.  First, it must be for “public use.”  Second, it must 
ultimately be accompanied by “just compensation.”9  If both these criteria 
are met, the taking falls within the realm of legitimate government action.  
This is represented by the overlapping area shown in Slide 3.  Conversely, 
takings that fail to meet either the “public use” or “just compensation” 
criteria would fall into the realm of impermissible governmental acts 
represented by the portion of the takings square that does not overlap with 
the oval of legitimacy.
10
   
At this point, we can identify three functional zones in our picture.  
First, there is a “free zone” (the part of the oval that does not overlap with 
the square).  In this area, which encompasses ordinary exercises of the 
police power, the government can go about its business without paying just 
compensation.
11
   Second, there is a “pay zone” (the overlap between square 
                                                 
9 Regulatory takings will not initially be accompanied by just compensation, but can still constitute 
legitimate governmental actions if ultimately validated by the payment of just compensation.  Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“The Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation precede the 
taking.”); see infra Part II.B. 
10 The remedial approach used in this area effectively rules out the possibility that acts will be found 
illegitimate due to the lack of just compensation alone, however.  Rather, courts transform otherwise valid but 
uncompensated takings into legitimate ones by ordering just compensation for the period of the taking.  See infra 
Part II.B.  
11 This zone is “free” in the sense that no cash compensation requirement is constitutionally imposed.  This 
does not necessarily mean it is free of political costs—the costs we’d expect governmental actors to attend to.  See 
generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional 
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).     
6 Fennell [15-Mar-12 
and oval), where just compensation is required.  Finally, there is a “no-go 
zone” (everything else, including the non-overlapping portion of the takings 
square).
12
  Slide 4 shows these zones, with the entire no-go zone, including 
the impermissible portion of the takings square, rendered as black space.
13
   
 
Slide 4 
 
 
 
   
Note that, as represented here, the “pay zone” falls entirely within the area 
of legitimate governmental action.
14
  To be sure, impermissible takings can 
occur (consider the nonoverlapping part of the takings square) but these acts 
do not qualify for the liability rule regime established by the Takings 
Clause; the appropriate judicial response is injunctive relief, not 
compensation.
15
    
                                                 
12 Following Calabresi and Melamed, there is a fourth logical possibility: that parties can keep the 
government from acting by paying it not to do something.  Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Alienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1116-18  (1972).  This 
possibility has limited applicability in the case of nonjudicial takings, although it bears a family resemblance to 
the exactions considered in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994).  I 
will discuss below how a version of this fourth alternative may feature in judicial takings analysis.  See Part III.C, 
infra.    
13 In some of the images that follow, the missing (impermissible) part of the takings square will reappear for 
expositional purposes, but these three basic zones should be held in mind throughout the balance of the analysis. 
14  See, e.g., Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 18; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (describing an inquiry into 
the validity of a governmental act as “logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects 
a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose”).   
15Saying an act is a taking does not necessarily mean it is governed by the liability rule regime established in 
the Takings Clause or that it violates the Takings Clause. By its terms, the Takings Clause’s just compensation 
requirement only applies to a subset of possible takings—those of private property for public use.  As discussed 
below, impermissible takings are better understood as violations of constraints lying outside of the Takings 
Clause.  See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.   
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B.    In and Out of the Pay Zone 
 
How does a governmental actor end up in the “pay zone” shown in Slide 
4?  There are two ways in: purposeful exercises of eminent domain, and 
regulatory actions that are deemed by the court to be the functional 
equivalent of eminent domain.  I will discuss each of these paths into the 
pay zone before turning to some interesting territory that lies outside that 
zone.   
 
1. Eminent Domain 
 
The first way into the pay zone is to consciously undertake a 
condemnation. There is no question that exercises of eminent domain are 
takings; the only question is whether the taking is for public use.  If so, it 
falls within the oval of legitimate governmental conduct.  Here, public use 
operates like a door that lets governmental entities enter into the pay zone 
on purpose.   
 
Slide 5 
 
 
 
 
In other words, the Takings Clause establishes a liability rule regime in 
which the government unilaterally accomplishes transfers from private 
parties to itself upon the payment of just compensation—but only if the 
taking is for public use. The gray squiggles surrounding the door in Slide 5 
8 Fennell [15-Mar-12 
represent this limiting principle; the government must enter through the 
“public use” door in order to qualify for the liability rule regime.  The 
Supreme Court has held that this portal allows in all takings that are 
rationally related to a public purpose.
16
 This standard gives a great deal of 
deference to governmental determinations that a particular taking 
constitutes a public use.  Nonetheless, the Court has warned that purely 
pretextual takings—ones that accomplish a naked transfer from private 
party A to private party B, accompanied only by a thin and unconvincing 
excuse for a public justification—would not satisfy the public use 
requirement.
17
  So the squiggles stay in the picture.   
Significant controversy surrounds the size and the shape of the public 
use door, and the way in which it is policed.  Kelo sparked a flurry of 
legislation to beef up the limits on public use beyond those articulated by 
the Supreme Court.
18
  Some state supreme courts have also read the Takings 
Clauses in their own state constitutions more restrictively than the U.S. 
Supreme Court read the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
19
  Thus, 
some jurisdictions have installed tougher bouncers at the public use door.
 20
   
Regardless of the source and content of the requirements that act to 
guard the door into the liability rule regime associated with eminent 
domain, one thing is clear:  the validity of a governmental act of eminent 
domain depends upon the payment of just compensation.  While disputes 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of the 
eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (declining to apply a 
“heightened form of review” in interpreting “public use”); id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that the 
public use standard the Court has long applied “echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic regulation 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses”).  Notably, however, the Kelo majority does not repeat the 
rational basis standard of review, which could be read as a toughening of the standard.  See Thomas W. Merrill, 
Six Myths About Kelo, 20 PROBATE & PROPERTY 19, 21 (2006); see infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.   
17 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (“it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for 
the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation”).   
18 See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo,  93 MINN. L. 
REV. 2100 (2009) (describing these reforms and questioning the efficacy of many of them).   
19 For example, in a case predating Kelo, the Michigan Supreme Court held that takings that deliver property 
into private hands must fit within one of three specified categories in order to qualify as public use.  County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)). 
20 The effect of a stricter state public use standard on this analysis is discussed below.  See text 
accompanying notes 60-68, infra.   These state limits resemble the ones set out by the  U.S. Supreme Court insofar 
as “public use” is used to divide illegitimate takings from permissible ones for which compensation must be paid.  
A very different meaning of “public use” would use the clause to filter from the class of permissible takings those 
for which compensation must be paid. See Jed Rubinfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993).  On Rubinfeld’s 
reading, other constitutional limits do the work of separating permissible from impermissible governmental 
takings, leaving the Public Use Clause to split up permissible takings between those that involve affirmative “use” 
by the government (and hence require compensation on his account) and those that do not involve such use (and 
hence would not require compensation on his account).  Rubinfeld’s approach would avoid some textual problems 
he flags with the Court’s reading of “public use,” including the fact that it makes the language superfluous. See id. 
at 1079 (describing the current reading of the “so-called ‘public-use requirement’” as “simply duplicative of the 
legitimate-state-interest test that every deprivation of property must satisfy under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses”); see also Part II.A.  His approach would also go some distance toward addressing the 
linguistic awkwardness of the category I refer to below as “confiscatory nontakings” by allowing for some 
“takings” to be both permissible and noncompensable.  See infra Part I.B.3; Rubinfeld, supra, at 1148-49.     
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may arise about the magnitude of this compensation, governmental actors 
who exercise the power of eminent domain have consciously chosen to 
enter the “pay zone.”  Like diners who enter a restaurant for a meal, they 
expect to get a bill; they should not come in if they are not willing to pay.   
 
2. Regulatory Takings  
 
There is another way into the pay zone. Instead of affirmatively 
exercising eminent domain, governmental actors may find themselves in the 
pay zone when the ordinary work they were doing in the “free zone” goes 
“too far.”21  A permanent physical occupation, even a trivial one, always 
goes too far.
22
  Other regulatory actions that impact property may or may 
not count as compensable takings.
23
 The notoriously ill-defined line 
dividing the free zone from the pay zone appears in Slide 6 as a thick 
dashed line.  
 
Slide 6 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
22 Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).   Some caveats are discussed in Part I.B.3, infra. 
23 Those regulatory acts that remove all economically viable use from a property and that are not justified by 
“background principles” will always be compensable takings.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992).  However, determining what counts as “all” presents challenges, as does the question of what counts 
as “background principles.”  Although it stands for a per se rule, Lucas does  little to brighten the line between the 
pay zone and free zone.  The prevailing framework for evaluating regulatory takings continues to be the one set 
out in   Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central factors, 
reiterated in Lingle, include “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent 
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” and the “character of the 
government action.”  Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
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This way of landing in the pay zone differs in important ways from the 
exercises of eminent domain discussed above.  In the case of eminent 
domain, the act’s location within the square of takings was a given, and the 
only question was whether it fell within the legitimate portion of that square 
(the pay zone) by qualifying as a public use.  Where regulatory takings are 
at issue, the situation is reversed.  Here, it is a given that the governmental 
act falls within the  realm of legitimate governmental activity—the shaded 
oval.
24
  What is contested is the act’s location relative to the line dividing 
compensable takings (the pay zone) from the ordinary stuff of governance, 
which requires no compensation (the free zone).  Where the condemning 
authority who exercises eminent domain seeks the shelter of the pay zone to 
legitimate what is unquestionably a taking, the regulatory actor hopes to 
stay out of the pay zone.   
There is another difference as well. The governmental entity who enters 
the pay zone by crossing over from the free zone will not have (yet) 
satisfied the just compensation requirement. Unlike an actor undertaking a 
conscious exercise of eminent domain, who will expect (if not exactly 
welcome) the associated bill, governmental actors who have inadvertently 
crossed over from the free zone may not be expecting a bill at all.
25
 These 
actors can choose to pay just compensation and go on regulating, or they 
can limit their financial exposure by abandoning the acts that went too far.  
In the latter case, however, they still may be on the hook for compensation 
associated with the time that the regulation was in force.
26
    
 
3. Confiscatory Nontakings 
 
As important as knowing how actors can land in the pay zone is 
understanding how they stay out.  It might seem that certain confiscatory 
acts, like appropriating or destroying a home or business outright, would 
always fall within the core meaning of a “taking.”  But this is not the case.  
Instead, the law delineates a few categories of governmental acts that will 
never constitute takings in the constitutional sense, even when they involve 
the outright appropriation or destruction of private property.
27
 This seeming 
anomaly can be explained by the idea that title is held subject to background 
principles that allow such actions under specified conditions, so that nothing 
                                                 
24 Obviously, a governmental act can be illegitimate, for any number of reasons.  If this is the case, however, 
there would not be a question of regulatory takings on the table at all.  The acts would instead fall into the “no go” 
zone of impermissible governmental actions.  
25 Of course, the finding that an act constituted a regulatory taking is unlikely to come as a complete 
surprise, and in some cases governmental entities may be fully aware that their act runs a high risk of being found 
to be a compensable taking.   
26 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); 
see Part II.B.2. 
27 An excellent account of these categories, which has greatly informed this section of the essay, is found in 
DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 110-20 (2002).   
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has really been “taken.”28   
The best known of the “never a taking” per se rules is the “nuisance 
exception.” Actions directed at controlling nuisances are deemed not to be 
takings, even when they have devastating effects on private property.
29
 
However, the application of the nuisance exception is far from clear cut, and 
the exception ultimately folds into the much-remarked difficulty locating 
the line between compensable and noncompensable governmental acts. 
Standard applications of the nuisance exception involve regulatory acts 
rather than outright confiscation or destruction, although the economic 
effects may be similar. Indeed, a nuisance-like rationale for the exercise of 
eminent domain, such as “blight,” is not generally thought to relieve 
governmental actors of the requirement that just compensation be paid if 
land is taken away permanently.
30
 This might often be explained by the fact 
that the use in question does not, in fact, rise to the level of a common law 
nuisance.
31
  But even where it plainly does, the compensation requirement 
could still be justified by breaking the governmental act into two temporally 
bounded components—nuisance abatement and affirmative use (or resale) 
of the land—and exempting only the former from compensation.32 A more 
difficult case is the demolition of property in the name of nuisance control, 
where the governmental actor does not take title to the property.
33
 
Other per se exceptions permit confiscation or destruction without 
compensation.  A representative example is the “conflagration rule” which 
holds that a public official fighting a raging fire may destroy property 
without compensation in order to create a firebreak.
34
  Similarly, courts 
                                                 
28 See supra note 23; infra note 29. 
29 This exception, combined with other traditional exceptions to the Takings Clause, evolved into the 
“background principles” exception articulated in Lucas. The Lucas court held that regulatory actions that 
eliminate all economically viable use will always be takings, unless the limitation in question “inhere[s] in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon 
land ownership.”  505 U.S. at 1029. 
30 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (in a case involving condemnation for redevelopment 
of a blighted area, holding that “[t]he rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just 
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking”).  It is true that the property that was 
the subject of the challenge in Berman was not itself blighted (but lay within a blighted area), but the Court gave 
no indication that the compensation requirement would be altered for those structures that were in fact blighted. 
31 Although the blight rationale is premised on the existence of a harmful or subnormal use, that use may or 
may not qualify as a nuisance under the common law.   
32 This point is clearer if we think first of the state regulating rather than confiscating.  In year 1, it might 
order an owner to destroy a blighted housing unit on (uncontroverted) nuisance grounds. No compensation is 
required, because this is nuisance control.  The owner complies, and thenceforth maintains the property in a way 
that creates no nuisance.  In year 2, the state cannot come back and demand the owner destroy all improvements 
on the land simply because there used to be a nuisance there.  Nor could it demand the owner hand over the 
property for free by citing the past presence of a nuisance on the site.  Doing so would be pretextual; it would go 
“too far.”  What the state cannot do in two steps, it should not be able to do by blurring them together into one.  
33 A recent Texas Supreme Court case addressed one facet of this issue in holding that “independent court 
review” is constitutionally required when an administrative agency demolishes blighted property without 
compensation on the grounds that it is a nuisance.  City of Dallas v. Heather Stewart,  No. 09-0257 (Tex. 2011)  
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2011/jul/090257.pdf.  
34 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 27 at 118-20; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n. 16 (discussing “litigation 
absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of ‘real and personal property, in cases of 
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have held that no compensation is due when police destroy property in the 
course of apprehending suspects or protecting the public order,
35
 or where 
property is destroyed in a military emergency.
36
  Forfeitures of property that 
occur in accordance with statutory and due process requirements are also 
exempted from Takings Clause scrutiny.
37
  Property damage that occurs 
pursuant to the federal government’s use of a navigational servitude has 
been likewise deemed to be beyond the reach of the Takings Clause.
38
  It is 
debatable how well each of these per se exceptions holds up to scrutiny, but 
a variety of interesting arguments have been put forward on behalf of a 
number of them.
39
   
Together, these doctrines mark out an area within the governmental 
“free zone” that looks and feels a great deal like what a lay person might 
call a taking, but which does not qualify for that label as a doctrinal 
matter.
40
  We already know that a governmental decision to appropriate 
property is not a necessary precondition to a finding of a taking; regulatory 
bodies may end up in the pay zone without meaning to do so.  The category 
of confiscatory nontakings outlined above further establishes that a 
governmental decision to appropriate property is not always sufficient to 
constitute a taking, either.  To show this, Slide 7 overlays a triangle 
representing outright governmental appropriations on our three-zone 
model.
41
  Outright appropriations may be impermissible acts,
42
 legitimate 
                                                                                                                            
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of 
others.”) (citing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19, 25 L. Ed. 980 (1880)). 
35 See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (holding no just compensation 
due when police caused severe damage to a convenience store in order to apprehend a suspect).  The California 
Supreme Court found ample support for its decision in “the so-called emergency exception to the just 
compensation requirement”  which it described as having “had a long and consistent history in both state and 
federal courts.”  Id. at 909.  Nonetheless, there has been some variation in state court approaches to this issue, 
with a few jurisdictions showing a willingness to find some law enforcement destructions to be takings.  See 
Charles E. Cohen, Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Owners’ Property in the Course of Law 
Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2002) Lior J. Strahilevitz, 
Case Note, When the Taking Itself is Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975 (1998). The U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the question in YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969), a case that held troops’ occupation of 
buildings that were under siege by rioters not to be a taking.  The YMCA Court focused on the fact that the 
property owner was a “particular intended beneficiary” of the act, a point that might be viewed as supporting 
compensation (under at least some circumstances) for destruction undertaken for public benefit.  See Strahilevitz, 
supra; Wallace v. City of Atlantic City, 257 N.J. Super. 404 (1992).    
36 See United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952).  
37 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 27, at 115-16; Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (holding 
that “government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired 
under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain”).  The use of the word 
“already” in Bennis is interesting insofar as it suggests some logically antecedent stage in which property claims 
are properly stripped from claimants before the issue of a taking ever arises.  The notion bears some resemblance 
to the idea of background principles articulated in Lucas. See supra note 29. 
38 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 27, at 111-14, 116-18.  
39 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-48 (1991) 
(distinguishing compensable takings from tort-regulating governmental interventions on the grounds that the 
former but not the  latter involve singling out); Rubinfeld, supra note 20 at (discussing governmental forfeitures as 
noncompensable takings based on his reading of the public use requirement).   
40 Taxation represents another type of governmental appropriation that has been deemed to fall categorically 
outside the Takings Clause’s purview.  For discussion and critique, see EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 283-305. 
41 I use the term “outright” here rather than “intentional” to avoid some ambiguities surrounding the notion 
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takings (conscious exercises of eminent domain), or legitimate, 
noncompensable acts (such as property forfeitures for criminal conduct). 
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C.  Taking Stock 
   
1. Two Contested Boundaries 
 
As the analysis thus far has established, takings jurisprudence grapples 
with two contested boundaries:  1) the line between takings that are not for 
public use and those that are (“the public use line”); and 2) the line between 
legitimate governmental acts that can be carried out without paying 
compensation and legitimate governmental acts that require compensation 
(“the regulatory takings line”). The placement of the public use line 
                                                                                                                            
of intent.  Presumably, the government is always engaging in intentional (as opposed to somnambulant or 
coerced) acts, even if it hopes an act will not lead to liability as a taking. Yet focusing on intended outcomes 
introduces possibilities like disingenuousness or fecklessness.  “Outright” speaks not to what an actor actually 
intended but rather whether the actor has taken a decision that it would publicly characterize as a confiscation or 
destruction of property.  See infra note 45 and accompanying text.   Other work on judicial takings has used the 
notion of intent in various ways to classify judicial acts.  See Barros, supra note 2; Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra 
note 2.  
42 Some governmental takings may flunk the conditions set out in the Takings Clause without being outright 
appropriations.  For example, suppose that a regulatory action were undertaken for purely private benefit.  
Depending on the extent of the regulation, it might be considered a taking, but it would (more importantly) also be 
a violation of the constitutional requirement that acts bear some rational relationship to a conceivable public 
purpose.  Hence, it would fall into the “no go” portion of the takings square, even if the governmental actor did 
not appropriate property outright.  The same can be said of regulatory acts that are ultra vires.  See generally 
Matthew Zinn, Note, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1998).  For this reason, there is a corner of the 
impermissible portion of the takings square that is not overlaid by Slide 7’s triangle of outright appropriations. 
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determines the scope of eminent domain, while the regulatory takings line 
determines the scope of regulatory takings.  Huge literatures address each of 
these boundaries, and academics have debated a variety of procedures for 
determining the location of these lines.  For our purposes, it is enough to 
note their presence together in our takings picture, as shown in Slide 8.  
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Putting the two boundaries together in the same diagram highlights an 
important contrast that will become important to the later analysis. The line 
defining the scope of regulatory takings—the boundary between the free 
zone and the pay zone—is actively policed by courts.43  In contrast, the line 
defining the scope of eminent domain—the boundary between the no-go 
zone and the pay zone—is, at least as far as the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence goes, largely self-policed by the political actors engaged in 
condemnations.
44
  This difference can be chalked up to differences in 
institutional competence. Courts view themselves as relatively good at 
telling when regulation goes “too far” but less good at determining what 
does and does not serve a public purpose.  Hence, they are willing to defer 
to legislative and executive branch actors in the latter case, but not in the 
                                                 
43 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1449 (“Although the question of when a particular legislative or judicial 
action constitutes a ‘taking’ is relatively muddled, the courts actively police the legislative and executive branches 
and, with growing frequency, invalidate actions that have gone too far.”).     
44 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (“For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed 
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public 
needs justify the use of the takings power.”).   
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former.  
 
2. Characterizations and Outcomes 
 
The two boundaries just discussed relate to two different ways that a 
governmental actor might characterize a given property-impacting act.
45
 
First, the actor might characterize the act as legitimate and noncompensable, 
part of her ordinary duties in adjusting the benefits and burdens of life in a 
complex society.  Alternatively, the actor might characterize the act as an 
outright appropriation of some sort that is undertaken for public use.  
A court reviewing the act may or may not accept the actor’s 
characterization; it may slot the act into any one of the three basic zones 
delineated in Slide 5.  The act might be deemed not for a public purpose at 
all, and hence be placed in the no-go zone, it might fall in the free zone as 
an act that is for public use but is not a taking, or it might be deemed a 
taking for public use for which just compensation is required.      
Table 1 shows the possible ways in which a governmental actor’s 
characterization and the court’s holding intersect to produce legal outcomes 
in takings cases.  The rows indicate the actor’s characterization, and the 
columns indicate the zone in which the court ultimately locates the act.  
 
Table 1: Outcomes in Takings Cases 
 
               Court’s 
Holding                       
 
Actor’s 
Characterization 
Not for Public 
Use 
 
 
[No-Go Zone] 
Not a Taking 
(But Is for 
Public Use) 
 
[Free Zone] 
Taking for 
Public Use 
 
 
[Pay Zone] 
 
Legitimate, 
Noncompensable 
Governmental Act 
 
 
impermissible 
act 
 
ordinary 
exercise of the 
police power 
 
 
regulatory 
taking 
  
Outright 
Appropriation for 
Public Use 
 
 
pretextual, 
invalid A to B 
transfer 
 
confiscatory 
nontaking  
 
 
eminent 
domain 
 
 
                                                 
45 I focus here on how the actor characterizes the act rather than what the actor “intends,” recognizing that 
there may be instances when the two do not match.  It is reasonable to assume that no actor will claim to be 
undertaking an act that is not for a public purpose, but that does not mean that serving the public is always what 
the actor truly “intends.”   
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Table 1’s top row gives us three alternative outcomes when a 
governmental actor is not engaging in an outright appropriation.  These, 
reading from left to right, are: 1) it will be found to be an impermissible act, 
outside the realm of legitimate government activity; 2)  it will be an 
ordinary exercise of the police power that is not compensable; or 3) it will 
be found to be a regulatory taking for which just compensation must be 
paid.  There are also three alternative outcomes when the governmental 
actor understands itself to be engaging in an appropriation.  These (again 
left to right) are: 1) it will be found to be a pretextual use of the eminent 
domain power, and hence invalid as a naked A to B transfer; 2) it will be 
found to fit within an exception such as the conflagration rule and thus 
treated as a confiscatory nontaking for which no compensation is due; or 3) 
it will be found to be a legitimate exercise of the eminent domain power for 
which just compensation must be paid.   
Slide  9 locates Table1’s four categories of legitimate governmental acts 
on the basic takings diagram.  Pretextual takings and other impermissible 
acts are lumped together in the no-go zone.   
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II.  WRONGS AND REMEDIES 
 
With the basic terrain of takings jurisprudence in mind, we can take on 
some complexities involving the boundaries depicted in Part I—how they 
are policed, what crossing them means, and how identified wrongs are 
remedied.  As suggested above, takings of private property are subject to 
two constitutional requirements: that the property be taken for public use, 
and that just compensation be paid.  I will examine these requirements in 
turn, and then make some observations about how and by whom the two 
boundaries identified above—the public use line, and the regulatory takings 
line—are policed.  In working through this analysis, I will continue to focus 
(for now) on nonjudicial takings.  
 
A.  Public Use 
 
Consider first the public use requirement.  Suppose that a governmental 
actor engages in an appropriation of private property that fails this test, 
perhaps by authorizing a clearly pretextual transfer from the actor’s enemy, 
A, to the actor’s friend, B.  Interestingly, this does not violate the literal 
terms of the Takings Clause.
46
 The clause bans taking private property for 
public use unless just compensation is paid.  It doesn’t, by its terms, have 
anything to say about taking private property for private use, whether to 
settle a score, pain an enemy, delight a friend, or accomplish any other 
purely private goal. This is not to say that takings for private use are 
constitutional.  But it suggests we must look outside the Takings Clause to 
understand why.
47
 One possibility has received recent attention: a taking 
that fails the public use test is a due process violation.
48
   
                                                 
46 See Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Takings 
Clause “silence” on takings for private use); John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the 
Judiciary is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 483 (2010)  (discussing the view that “the Takings Clause only applies 
to takings for public use and does not apply at all to actions that do not serve a public use” and citing Coniston). 
47 Courts and commentators have generally assumed that the public use requirement is a requirement of the 
Takings Clause, but the language is in tension with that interpretation. Judge Posner discusses this point at some 
length in Coniston:  “It can be argued that if the taking is not for a public use, it is unconstitutional, but perhaps 
not as a taking; for all the takings clause says is ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.’ This language specifies a consequence if property is taken for a public use but is silent on the 
consequences if property is taken for a private one. Perhaps the effect of this silence is to dump the case into the 
due process clause. The taking would then be a deprivation of property without due process of law.” 844 F. 2d at 
464.  Posner goes on to detail a number of difficulties with this interpretation, including its apparent inconsistency 
with some, but not all, prior statements on the matter by the Supreme Court, before deciding that the matter need 
not be decided in order to handle the case at hand.  Id.   
48 See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 19 (“A better way to describe the situation of takings for 
private use is that they do not fall within the scope of the state’s power to act at all and, for the same reason, 
violate due process.”).  This accords with the possibility raised by Judge Posner in his ultimately inconclusive 
Coniston discussion. See note 47, supra.  It also aligns with an observation made in a student note in a slightly 
different takings context.  See Zinn, supra note 42, at 282-83 (citing Coniston and discussing the view that “the 
public use requirement serves as a boundary line between actions remediable by just compensation under the 
Takings Clause and those that amount to ‘deprivations’ that the Due Process Clause is intended to address”).   
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This answer fits together neatly with the Supreme Court’s test for public 
use. The test is whether the taking in question is rationally related to a 
public purpose.
49
  This is a means-ends test.  In Lingle v. Chevron, the 
Court made clear that means-ends tests have no place in Takings Clause 
jurisprudence.  The focus in Lingle was on a more demanding means-ends 
test that had been carelessly repeated in a series of regulatory takings cases, 
but the point was stated quite broadly.
50
 The best way of understanding the 
“public use” requirement in the Takings Clause, then, is as a prerequisite for 
qualifying for the clause’s liability rule regime.51  When a taking does not 
qualify, it simply does not fall within the Takings Clause at all, much less 
violate it.
52
  Instead, it is better understood as violating substantive due 
process.
53
   
This analysis suggests that there is nothing special about the 
impermissible portion of the takings square; it disappears into a much more 
general prohibition on governmental actors undertaking acts that fail to 
meet the requisite means-ends test.
54
  As such, it seems appropriate to 
depict impermissible takings as of a piece with other forms of prohibited 
governmental actions; all are indistinguishable parts of the no-go zone first 
identified in Slide 4 above.  But there remain a few wrinkles to work 
through.    
One question is whether the Supreme Court’s test for public use is 
identical to, or more stringent than, the ordinary rational basis review that  
defines the minimum standard for due process.  Kelo indicates that the 
public use requirement would not be met if the condemnor had an 
impermissible purpose of transferring property for purely private benefit.
55
 
Some scholars have read this statement to mean that Kelo requires the 
condemnor to be actually pursuing a public purpose.
56
 This would indeed be 
                                                 
49 See supra note 16.     
50 It is certainly possible to question the crispness of the distinction the Lingle Court draws between the 
means-ends analysis that it associates with due process and the Takings Clause’s concern with burden distribution. 
See infra note 86.  Nonetheless, the public use test as stated by the Court is squarely positioned on the means-ends 
side of the line.   
51 See Coniston, 844 F.2d at 464 (“Rather than being viewed simply as a limitation on governmental power 
the Takings Clause could be viewed as the source of a governmental privilege: to take property for public use 
upon payment of the market value of that property . . . .”); see also id. (describing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mo Pac Ry Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) as follows: “the privilege created by the Takings Clause was 
stripped away, the state was exposed as having taken a person's property without due process of law”), 
52 See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 20. 
53 Id. at 19. It might also violate other limits on governance contained in the Constitution or in relevant 
statutory provisions.   
54 Usually this is rational basis review. However, elevated scrutiny applies when suspect classifications or 
fundamental rights are at issue.   
55 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (“Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public 
purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”). 
56 Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 15; see also Merrill, supra note 16, at 21 (observing that “the 
decision appears to contemplate that courts should carefully review condemnations that result in a private 
retransfer of property, or are not carried out in accordance with some planning exercise, to determine whether the 
government is taking property “under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow 
a private benefit” (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478)). 
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a stronger requirement than the usual rational basis standard that requires 
only a conceivable public purpose. But not having an improper purpose is a 
different and easier requirement to meet than actually having a proper 
purpose—and the former seems to be already embedded in the usual 
rational basis analysis.
57
   
Nonetheless, there are some indications in Kelo (both in Justice 
Stevens’s opinion for the Court and in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence) that 
planning efforts may be relevant to the validity of economic development 
takings.
58
 These suggestions might be read to contemplate a somewhat more 
purposeful pursuit of the public interest than is usually required  by rational 
basis review—one that is consistent with understanding public use as a door 
that a government actor must open and enter by engaging the appropriate 
institutional apparatus.  Yet even if a somewhat stronger means-ends test 
were applied as a matter of federal constitutional law, Lingle’s analysis still 
tells us it would remain a due process standard and not a Takings Clause 
standard.
59
 As far as current federal constitutional law goes, then, there is 
neither daylight nor overlap between a due process violation and a taking 
that meets the public use requirement; a given condemnation is either one or 
the other, never both, and never neither.   
A trickier issue is presented by the heightened public use requirements 
that some states have imposed as a matter of statutory or state constitutional 
law.
60
 Could these additional hurdles make a condemnation impermissible 
under state law (because it does not meet the heightened state standard) 
while still leaving it in compliance with the federal requirements for due 
process?  The key question is whether state law constrains what counts as a 
                                                 
57 Peñalver and Strahilevitz recognize this, characterizing any distinction between the rational basis standard 
and the standard for public use as “more apparent than real,” insofar as any legislation that is actually found to be 
motivated by an improper purpose will be struck down on rational basis review.  Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra 
note 2, at 17 n. 51 (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491).  
58 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007) (referencing the 
“Court's implicit suggestion [in Kelo] (made explicit by Justice Kennedy in concurrence) that public, participatory 
planning is a constitutional safe harbor and may separate impermissible ‘private’ takings from presumptively valid 
public ones”); see also Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 48 n.156 (referencing “the very extensive 
legislative findings and planning in Kelo, which the majority deemed necessary to justify the use of the eminent 
domain power for economic development purposes”); Merrill, supra note 16, at 21 (suggesting that Kelo asks 
courts “to investigate the factual circumstances” for evidence of pretext). 
59 Lingle goes further, however, by rejecting the possibility of any elevated means-ends analysis in the 
regulatory takings context (exactions cases aside).  The Court cites prudential considerations for rejecting the 
“substantially advances” test that would apply with equal force if the test were imported into the due process 
analysis. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (explaining that “the ‘substantially advances’ formula is not only doctrinally 
untenable as a takings test—its application as such would also present serious practical difficulties” because “it 
would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which 
courts are note well suited”).  Hence, Lingle not only evicts the medium-tough “substantially advance a legitimate 
state interest” test from the Takings Clause and exiles it to the land of due process, but also suggests its beefed-up 
formulation has no place at all in federal constitutional jurisprudence surrounding land use decisions.  See Lynn E. 
Blais, The Problem With Pretext, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 963, 982-983 (2011) (arguing that the Lingle Court’s 
“doctrinal fit” and “institutional legitimacy” concerns “also dictate that the concern for pretext fall out of eminent 
domain jurisprudence”).   
60 See supra notes 18-19. 
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legitimate state interest (or its alter ego, “a public use”) for federal due 
process purposes.
61
  If so, there would again be neither daylight nor overlap 
between a permissible taking (this time under state law) and a federal due 
process violation. If not, we would run into the following interesting 
situation: that one and the same act could land in the pay zone for federal 
law purposes and in the no-go zone for state law purposes.
62
  
Clearly, a state could not meaningfully apply stricter public use limits 
than those in the U.S. Constitution (as Justice Stevens, writing for the Court 
in Kelo, emphasized they could
63
) if governmental actors could continue to 
access the “pay zone” regardless of what state law says about it.  Hence, the 
violation of heightened state public use standards must be enjoinable.  In the 
typical eminent domain case, this would mean no taking would occur at all, 
and hence there would be nothing left to fall within the federal pay zone.  It 
would be logically possible for a regulatory taking that failed to meet a 
heightened state public use requirement to be enjoined and yet still be 
subject to a just compensation requirement (for any interim period) under 
federal law.
64
  But this seems out of keeping with the Supreme Court’s view 
of the takings clause as a domain in which otherwise valid acts are 
evaluated to determine if compensation is required.
65
   
An answer more consonant with existing doctrine and principles of 
federalism is that a taking that does not meet state public use requirements 
can never truly be “for public use” for federal constitutional purposes either, 
since it is an act that by all rights never should have happened.
66
  The 
Supreme Court has treated ultra vires acts in just this manner,
67
 and whether 
                                                 
61 This same question will return later in an even more interesting guise.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
62 Cf. Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CON. L. & 
PUB POL’Y 91, 97 (2011) (stating that “even if the court’s action is illegal under state law that does not mean that 
it cannot also qualify as a taking under federal constitutional law.”). Although Somin discusses the situation where 
state law is violated by a court, his logic would also apply with equal force to nonjudicial actors who violate a 
state’s elevated public use requirement.   
63 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”); Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question 
for Richard Epstein, 44 TULSA L. REV. 741, 762-63 (2009) (lauding the federalism implications of the Supreme 
Court’s stance in Kelo).    
64 I set aside here the procedural questions of whether and when a federal court might hear such a case, given 
Williamson County’s requirements.   
65 See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.  Allowing federal compensation for interim takings that violate state 
public use requirements could also introduce moral hazard concerns if it delayed challenges on public use grounds 
at the state level by those hoping to glean a large interim payment in addition to an injunction.    
66 To be sure, the Court has held in other contexts that a governmental act may violate state law without 
necessarily amounting to a federal constitutional violation.  See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) 
(holding that an arrest that violates state law did not violate the 4th amendment); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 
(1944) (no equal protection violation when a state election law was violated).   But the issue here is distinct in that 
the very thing that legitimates the act at the federal level is its pursuit of a public purpose, a term that is 
meaningless without reference to the purposes a given state actor is empowered by its jurisdiction to pursue. 
67 See Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910) (“The constitutional prohibition against taking 
private property for public use without just compensation is directed against the Government, and not against 
individual or public officers proceeding without the authority of legislative enactment. The taking of private 
property by an officer of the United States for public use, without being authorized, expressly or by necessary 
implication, to do so by some act of Congress, is not the act of the Government.”); see generally Zinn, supra note 
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or not a given condemnation literally falls into that category, the same 
reasoning arguably applies.
68
  Importing state law to limit public use seems 
as appropriate, and as necessary, as importing state law into the meaning of 
property itself.   
 
B.  Just Compensation 
 
Consider next the just compensation requirement.  Once a governmental 
act qualifies as a taking for public use, just compensation must be paid.  It 
might seem, then, that a taking for which a governmental actor did not pay 
at all, or did not pay enough, would fall into the impermissible realm as 
surely as would a taking that was not for public use. Certainly, courts 
regularly consider the possibility that the Just Compensation Clause has 
been violated in just such ways.  But thinking about where such a 
governmental act fits into our diagram reveals an interesting wrinkle.   
 
1.  A Fine Fix 
 
Otherwise legitimate governmental acts that amount to takings are not 
relegated to the impermissible realm simply due to an actor’s failure to 
voluntarily pay full just compensation. The reason is simple: whenever an 
uncompensated taking is otherwise legitimate (for public use, and not in 
violation of any other limitation on governmental action), courts force 
governmental bodies to pay just compensation for as long as the taking 
continues.
69
 This is subtly different from forcing governmental bodies to 
pay damages for having violated the Just Compensation Clause.  In other 
words, one need not pay in advance, or pay willingly, to end up in “pay 
zone.” One merely needs to do otherwise legitimate acts for which 
compensation is due.  The zone, then, is best understood not as an “already 
paid” or “willingly paid” zone, but rather as a “must pay zone.” 
Paying just compensation transforms what otherwise would have been 
an impermissible governmental act into a permissible one under the Takings 
Clause, even if the governmental entity did not initially offer to make the 
payment.  Even if the government immediately chooses to discontinue the 
act that is found to be a taking, it still must pay just compensation for the 
time period that the taking for public use was in effect.
70
  As soon as a 
                                                                                                                            
42. 
68 The question of how to treat various kinds of governmental errors or excesses under takings law has 
received some scholarly attention. See generally David W. Spohr, “What Shall We Do With the Drunken Sailor?” 
The Intersection of the Takings Clause and the Character, Merit, or Impropriety of Regulatory Action, 17 
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL L.J. 1 (2008);  Zinn, supra note 42; John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. 
REV. 1047(2000).  See also infra Part III.A.1 (discussing ultra vires acts in the context of judicial takings).    
69 First English, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).    
70 Id. 
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violation is established, just compensation is due and owing, and once it is 
paid, the violation disappears and is replaced by a legitimate governmental 
act that complies with the Takings Clause. 
In other words, there is an implicit doctrinal rule that any past or 
ongoing taking that can be legitimated by just compensation must be 
legitimated by just compensation—unless and until the government stops 
doing it.
71
  Known cases of nonjudicial takings in which just compensation 
has not been paid are addressed with a payment requirement that has the 
interesting effect of validating the governmental act ex post.   
 
2. No Way Out 
 
The flip side of the remedial point just made is that governmental actors 
may get stuck with an unexpected bill. Once a governmental actor enters the 
pay zone, whether by exercising eminent domain or by crossing a hazy line 
in the course of regulating, there is “no way out” in the following sense:  
whatever has been taken must be paid for.  In the eminent domain context, 
this principle works in a straightforward way, subject only to disputes about 
the appropriate measure of just compensation.
72
  In the context of regulatory 
takings, however, things become more complex.  The governmental actor is 
not forced to go on taking, and can give up the regulation in question in 
response to the litigation outcome.  This does not pull the earlier action out 
of the pay zone during the time it was in force, however; just compensation 
must still be paid for whatever is found to have been taken.
73
  Governmental 
bodies can thus respond to a finding of a regulatory taking by keeping the 
regulation in place and paying  just compensation for the full impact on the 
property, or withdrawing the regulation and paying a prorated price for the 
interim period.
74
  
The requirement that regulators who abandon their regulatory takings 
must nonetheless pay just compensation for the interim period was 
                                                 
71 Accordingly, those whose property has been taken by a governmental party with the ability to pay are 
entitled to nothing more (and nothing less) than just compensation. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 467 U.S. 
986, 1016 (1984) cited in Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Part III.D.2 
(discussing the remedial question in the judicial takings context).   
72 Some states do, however, have what amounts to a liberal return policy in which a condemnor confronted 
with the fiscal consequences of just compensation has the choice to decide not to go through with the purchase 
after all.  Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2613-14  (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Even there, however, payments are 
required to make up for the delay and dislocation associated with the condemnation.  Id. 
73 First English, 482 U.S. at 321 (“where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use 
of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the 
period during which the taking was effective”). 
74 Alternatively, the governmental actor may amend the regulation, again paying for any interim taking.  See 
id.  at 321 (“Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options 
already available -- amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent 
domain.”).  Significantly, the fact that governmental actors who are found to have committed takings have this 
range of choice does not mean that reviewing courts can choose among these remedies at will.     
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established in First English.
75
  That rule was not changed in Tahoe-Sierra, a 
case that held there is no per se taking where a moratorium renders property 
valueless for a time.
76
  Squaring the two cases is a conceptual challenge, 
and it is worth noting that not one Justice signed onto both majority 
opinions.
77
  The tension between the cases arises because First English 
holds that a governmental actor must pay even if its taking (it turns out) 
only lasted for a while, whereas Tahoe-Sierra suggests that rendering 
property valueless temporarily is not a per se compensable taking.
78
  The 
fancy footwork required to square the two cases focuses on whether 
something is, or is not, “really” a taking, a question that seems to be 
answered from an ex ante perspective. Thus, the fact that a taking ends does 
not keep it from having been, during its short life, a taking for which 
compensation is due.
79
  This is true even if a similar regulation that was 
designed from the outset to  have a similar effect and duration would not be 
a compensable taking.
80
   
The conceptual tension remains when we consider the just 
compensation requirement.  If the assessment that an action “was” a taking 
is based on the whole thing having been taken, and if the smaller time slice 
would not have been a taking on its own,
81
 then how does a court arrive at 
the conclusion that the time slice (and only the time slice) must be 
compensated for?  One explanation would be that the government is 
actually required to, and does, compensate for the full (permanent) taking, 
but does so only partly in cash. The rest of the compensation is provided in 
kind by relinquishing the regulation.
82
  The ability to pay for takings in kind 
is not open-ended, as the exactions analysis in Nollan and Dolan 
                                                 
75 482 U.S. at 319 (“Where this burden [on the owner] results from governmental action that amounted to a 
taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the landowner for 
the value of the use of the land during this period.”). 
76 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).   
77 Both cases were decided 6-3 less than fifteen years apart, but the Court experienced significant turnover in 
the interim.  Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in First English, joined by Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, Powell, and Scalia.  Justice Stevens dissented, joined in part by Justices Blackmun and 
O’Connor.  In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens penned the majority opinion, joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas.   
78 This does not mean, of course, that the temporary interference might not be a taking under Penn Central.  
Still, the Court’s refusal to apply a per se test suggests that at least some regulations that temporarily remove all 
economically viable use will fail to amount to takings.   
79 First English, 482 U.S. at 319 (“Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this period 
of time, though converting the taking into a ‘temporary’ one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the 
Just Compensation Clause.”).   
80 Such a regulation would be deemed “prospectively temporary” and hence subject to Tahoe Sierra’s rule 
that Penn Central balancing applies.  See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 264-65 
(3d ed. 2005) (distinguishing “retrospectively temporary” takings from “prospectively temporary” actions and 
citing cases). 
81 Of course, it is possible that a given time slice might be a taking on its own.  See supra note 78.  But if we 
assume that at least some time slices would not be takings on their own, the conundrum spelled out in the text 
would remain.   
82 Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215 
(1985) (discussing “implicit in-kind compensation” as an alternative to cash payments in the regulatory takings 
context).     
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establishes.
83
 But within this limited context, recognizing an implicit in-
kind payment may offer the clearest conceptual way of understanding what 
is going on.   
 
C.  The Inviolable Takings Clause?  
 
The public use and just compensation analysis together suggest that 
once a court finds a taking has occurred, it will classify the act in one of two 
ways.  Either it will be deemed an impermissible act that does not qualify 
for the Takings Clause’s liability rule regime at all, or it will be an act 
which can, and hence must, be validated by the payment of just 
compensation for however long the taking continues.  Slide 10 shows how 
these observations map onto the diagrams developed above.  
  
Slide 10 
 
 
 
 
It might seem, then, that the Takings Clause cannot actually be violated 
in a lasting way, once the courts get hold of a case.  To be sure, during the 
                                                 
83 Nollan held that the government cannot exact concessions that would constitute takings if appropriated 
outright as a condition of lifting regulations unless there is an “essential nexus” between the reason for the original 
regulation and the concession requested. 483 U.S. at 837.  Dolan added a requirement of “rough proportionality” 
between the concession and the problem to which the original regulation responded.  512 U.S. at 391.  Together, 
these cases appear to limit the ability of governments to pay for what would otherwise be takings by offering “in 
kind” regulatory concessions.  A clever extension and examination of this point is provided in Douglas T. Kendall 
& James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan 
and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1803-04 (1995) (describing a circumvention of Nollan and Dolan in which a 
governmental entity takes land through eminent domain, and then offers the landowner a choice between cash 
compensation and a development permit—an approach the authors describe as “not obviously constitutional”).    
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time when no, or inadequate, compensation has been paid, there is an 
ongoing violation of the Takings Clause that might, in fact, never get 
addressed through a payment of compensation. Moreover, if we 
contemplate the possibility that a governmental actor without access to any 
funds (i.e., a court) can engage in takings, then this after-the-fact validation 
through payment might no longer be available.  The point is not to declare 
the Takings Clause literally inviolable, but rather to observe that the clause 
builds in a liability rule fix that so neatly erases the violation and legitimates 
the underlying act as to effectively take the question of other remedies off 
the table—in the nonjudicial context.  If the clause is to be applied in 
situations where that fix is unavailable, the question of remedies must be 
confronted anew.
84
   
 
D.  Two Borders, Different Patrols 
 
The analysis thus far has focused on ways that actors may run athwart 
boundaries, while saying little about how those boundaries are policed.  
Thinking about Slide 8’s two boundaries in tandem leads to the following 
observation: Courts more actively police the regulatory takings line than 
they police the public use line.
85
 Institutional competence provides an 
explanation, and one that is illuminated by the reasoning in Lingle v. 
Chevron.  In Lingle, the Court held that the Takings Clause is meant to 
protect against undue burdens selectively placed on particular property 
owners, while the Due Process Clause is meant to address issues relating to 
an improper means-ends fit.  Determining what constitutes an inordinate 
burden on property owners can be understood as the kind of 
countermajoritarian check for which courts are especially well suited. 
Conversely, because determining the relationship between means and ends 
is the province of the nonjudicial branches, judicial review in this area is 
(under most circumstances) limited to a highly deferential rational basis 
test.  
Separating out problems of inordinate burdening from problems of 
means-ends fit works out less cleanly than the Court’s discussion in Lingle 
might suggest.
86
 Nonetheless, we can draw at least a rough distinction 
                                                 
84 The problem of remedies is well recognized in the judicial takings literature and is also evidenced by the 
conflicting views of the plurality and of Justice Kennedy in Stop the Beach.  
85 By “actively,” I do not mean to suggest anything about the government’s win-loss rates—an inquiry that 
would be complicated in any event by selection effects.  See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).  I mean only that there is more analytic engagement with the 
question of regulatory takings, as evidenced by the raft of complex, interacting tests, than with the question of 
what counts as a “public use”—at least in the context of the U.S. Constitution.   
86 See Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 529 
(2009) (suggesting that the “character factor” in the Penn Central test may reintroduce considerations that look a 
great deal like substantive due process); Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL L. 421 
(2010) (arguing that the “substantially advances a legitimate state interest” test might play a role in takings 
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between the two boundaries depicted in Slide 8 based on which sort of 
inquiry dominates.   
 
1. Policing The Public Use Line 
 
As already suggested, the public use line embodies a means-ends test 
that is highly deferential to legislative and executive actors, on the grounds 
that they are best able to determine how to achieve legitimate governmental 
objectives.  If these actors appear to be deploying their institutional faculties 
appropriately by, for example, engaging in planning and remaining free of 
the influence of any particular rent-seeker, federal courts will accept their 
judgment on the public use issue.  
Courts do, however, stringently police the payment of just 
compensation.
87
 This too can be understood in terms of the institutional 
division of labor suggested above—failure to provide just compensation 
relates directly to the problem of inordinate burdens.  The lenient public use 
test can be criticized to the extent that remaining undercompensation causes 
exercises of eminent domain to embed an element of inordinate 
burdening,
88
 but the basic institutional division of labor it embodies follows 
the distinction set out in Lingle.
89
  
 
2. Policing the Regulatory Takings Line 
 
Regulatory takings doctrine is notoriously muddled.
90
 But this is in large 
                                                                                                                            
jurisprudence conceptualized as “boundary maintenance”).  At the most basic level, the question of whether I am 
unduly burdened by a particular type of regulatory action depends on what I get back from it in expected value 
terms, if we were to imagine a hypothetical ex ante bargain.  And what I get back depends, in turn, on the 
relationship between the regulation and its legitimate governmental goals.   See, e.g., Fenster, supra, at 552 
(discussing the possibility that in some regulatory takings cases the state will “be able to identify the increased 
property value the owner enjoys as a result of a regulatory program that also restricts her neighbors’ property”) 
(emphasis in original).   
87 I thank Richard Epstein for raising this point.  As has been well noted, the constitutional standard for 
payments of just compensation is fair market value, which embeds a certain degree of undercompensation. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW [58] (7th ed. 2007); EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 183. To be 
sure,  many actual exercises of eminent domain provide richer compensation packages than fair market value.  See 
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 105, 121-26 
(2006).  But this does not eliminate the need for adequate judicial checks. 
88 It would be possible to do more to break out the remaining burden for judicial scrutiny. I have argued 
elsewhere that eminent domain can be usefully broken into two components—the compensated taking, and the 
uncompensated appropriation of the increment by which the compensation is incomplete.  Lee Anne Fennell, 
Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 958-59 This latter component, I argue, should be 
assessed using standards that resemble those which separate compensable from noncompensable regulatory 
takings.  See id. at 981-92.  This reformulation would more precisely allocate the means-ends portion of the 
process to legislative and executive actors, leaving only the issue of inordinate burdens with the courts.   
89 A deferential federal standard also arguably advances the values of federalism and subsidiarity by 
allowing states to offer greater protections.  See Ellickson, supra note 63 at 762-63. 
90 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 561 (1984); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741, 743 (1999).  Not all 
commentators attach a negative connotation to the  muddle, however. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of 
Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 190 (2002) (“As an essentially contested concept, 
15-Mar-12] PICTURING TAKINGS 27 
part because courts are more actively engaged in policing whether a given 
regulatory act crosses the line.  Even if the great majority of regulatory acts 
are not viewed as takings, there are enough instances of pushback to keep 
the doctrinal wheels churning.  Yet for all its complexity, regulatory takings 
doctrine has always been underpinned by a basic commitment to allowing 
governmental actors to carry on the ordinary business of governance 
without the constant need for compensation. Justice Holmes’s words in 
Pennsylvania Coal set up the point nicely: 
 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law.  As long 
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied 
limitation and must yield to the police power.
91
 
  
Holmes then discusses the scope of this implied limitation, including the 
famous line that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”92  What it means for government to go “too far” has received a 
great deal of attention, but it is equally useful to think about the implicit 
requirement (couched as a limitation on all property) that government be 
permitted to “go on” at all. 
There are reasons why courts might be especially well qualified to make 
this judgment. As actors that oversee the common law development of 
property, courts are arguably best positioned to know when a given act 
interferes so severely with established expectations surrounding property as 
to require compensation, and when instead it merely instantiates a business-
as-usual application of the police power.  The Court indicated in Lingle that 
questions of inordinate burden lie at the heart of the takings analysis,
93
 and 
the regulatory takings tests are generally directed at identifying the kinds of 
burdens on property owners that should in fairness be borne by the 
community as a whole.
94
  These questions of burden-assessment, bound up 
                                                                                                                            
[regulatory takings doctrine] is fertile and generative precisely because it is inevitably, and perhaps 
quintessentially, vague and unresolvable.”); Fenster, supra note 86, at 529-30 (“To invoke the jargon of software 
design, this messiness is neither a bug nor a feature in regulatory takings doctrine but part of its operating 
instructions ....”) (footnote omitted). Moreover, as James Krier has noted, takings is hardly unique in its doctrinal 
difficulty:  “[A] lot of questions in the legal world are inherently hard to deal with—and are so for the same 
reasons that takings questions are—yet, so far as I can see, all of those hard questions taken together have 
provoked nowhere near the claims of Babel that run through the takings literature.” James E. Krier, The Takings-
Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM AND MARY L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1997). 
91 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
92 Id. at 415.  
93 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (characterizing takings tests as “focus[ing] directly upon the severity of the burden 
that government imposes upon private property rights”).  
94 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole.”). 
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as they are in issues of background principles about what property means 
and what expectations accompany it, are ones that courts might seem 
especially well-equipped to evaluate.     
Some aspects of the Penn Central test do seem to embed questions of 
means-ends fit—how, for example, can we know whether there is an 
average reciprocity of advantage unless we know whether a particular 
measure produces the hoped-for result?
95
 How can we know whether a 
party is unduly burdened by a regulation unless we know something about 
what the regulation is meant to accomplish?
96
 These means-ends elements 
would seem to blend due process questions into the takings analysis on the 
Court’s own account, making the institutional competence question harder 
to parse.   More generally, there is plenty of room to criticize the specific 
ways in which regulatory takings doctrine has developed.  But the 
dominance of the undue burden and background principle inquiries in 
establishing the line between compensable and noncompensable takings 
helps to explain the Court’s relatively greater involvement in policing that 
line.   
 
III.  JUDICIAL TAKINGS, ILLUSTRATED 
 
My discussion to this point has been limited to takings (or alleged 
takings) by actors in the political branches. Can a court, by issuing a 
decision impacting property rights, also commit a taking within the meaning 
of the Takings Clause? This question was raised but not resolved in Stop the 
Beach, a case that involved a challenge by beachfront property owners to a 
Florida Supreme Court decision.
97
  The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
held that the Florida Supreme Court had not committed a judicial taking.
98
 
The facts of the case are less important for our purposes than the 
disagreements that erupted among the Justices about the existence and 
possible contours of a judicial takings doctrine. A four-justice plurality 
(Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and 
Thomas) whole-heartedly endorsed the idea of a judicial takings doctrine.  
The plurality maintained that a taking is a taking, regardless of which 
branch of government commits it.
99
 The other Justices expressed doubts 
                                                 
95 See supra note 86. 
96 See Fenster, supra note 86, at 571 (arguing that after Lingle, “[t]he character factor [in the Penn Central 
test] gives courts the discretion to consider the significance of the government’s regulatory purpose in cases in 
which that purpose might justify exceptional economic harm to the property owner.”).   
97 The Florida Supreme Court read state property law to permit a legislatively directed avulsive widening of 
the public portion of the beach.  The fact that the judicial decision at issue in Stop the Beach followed upon and 
ratified a legislative act places it in a different category factually than the purely court-initiated changes I will 
discuss here.  See text accompanying notes 106-107 infra.   
98 All eight justices participating in the case joined the portion of Scalia’s opinion finding that there was no 
taking.  Justice Stevens recused himself.   
99 See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion, Scalia, J.) (“It would be absurd to allow a State 
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about the viability of such a doctrine, as well as concern about a number of 
procedural and remedial issues that would be raised if such a doctrine were 
recognized.
100
  The result was an inconclusive mass of contradictory signals 
that has become, for property scholars at least, an endless source of 
speculation, concern, and fascination.  
A primary worry expressed in the judicial takings literature to date is 
that an unconstrained doctrine could have devastating effects on the 
evolution of the common law of property.
101
 Indeed, without any limiting 
principles capable of saving the ordinary adjudication of property disputes 
from takings scrutiny, the enterprise of recognizing judicial takings at all 
seems doomed from the outset.
102
  Some might respond that the enterprise 
should be doomed—that judicial takings is a bad idea for a whole host of 
practical and conceptual reasons.  But because four members of the 
Supreme Court have indicated a willingness to entertain judicial taking 
challenges, it is worth giving attention to the question of how such a 
doctrine might be limited.
103
  Like others who have written on this topic, I 
will assume in what follows that there can be such a thing as judicial 
takings. However, I will suggest some plausible limiting principles that 
could make judicial takings something rarely encountered in the wild.
104
 
These limiting principles emerge when we adapt the diagrams above to 
the judicial context. Three features are of particular importance. The first is 
the presence of two different, and differently policed, boundaries. The 
second is the category of confiscatory nontakings. The third is a feature 
notable for its absence in the earlier diagrams: a fourth category to add to 
the triad of no-go zone, free zone, and pay zone. Following Calabresi and 
Melamed, there must be (and is) a fourth possibility in which the 
government does not take if the would-be takee pays. Although this 
possibility has limited applicability to legislative and administrative 
                                                                                                                            
to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”).   
100 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, argued that the Due Process Clause, not the Takings 
Clause, should provide the first line of defense against improper judicial actions.  130 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, took the plurality to task for “unnecessarily address[ing] 
questions of constitutional law that are better left for another day.” Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
101  See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court 
Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 107, 107-08 (2011); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New 
Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247 (2011).  Concerns about the federalism implications of a 
judicial takings doctrine have also been raised. See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra; Richard Ruda, Do We Really 
Need a Judicial Takings Doctrine?  35 VT. L. REV. 451, 456-58 (2010).  But see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1509 
(maintaining that federalism arguments fail to “explain why we should apply different constitutional standards to 
state courts than to state legislatures and administrative agencies.”). 
102 Justice Breyer expressed concerns along these lines in his Stop the Beach concurrence, noting “the failure 
of [the plurality’s] approach to set forth procedural limitations or canons of deference.” 130 S. Ct. at 2619 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
103 Or as Peñalver and Strahilevitz colorfully put it (without necessarily endorsing the premise behind the 
metaphor): “When a car is careening off the road, it is better to have it crash into the bushes than into a crowded 
cafe.”  Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 49. 
104 See Dogan & Young, supra note 101, at 134 (contending that “[e]xcept in unusual situations, judicial 
takings should remain the stuff of law review articles and plurality opinions, rather than the law of the land”). 
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takings,
105
 it can play a significant role in judicial decisionmaking, as we 
will see.  Each of these features suggests a set of potential limits on a 
judicial takings doctrine. In combination, they could render judicial takings 
a nearly null set.   
My discussion here will be limited in two important ways.  First, I focus 
only on how a judicial takings doctrine might be developed to govern stand-
alone judicial decisions that alter or reinterpret property rights. For 
example, a court might make a pronouncement in a trespass case that affects 
the rights of many beachfront property owners, completely independently of 
any action by a legislature or agency.  In contrast, many scenarios in which 
judicial takings challenges might arise (including Stop the Beach itself) 
involve judicial ratification of legislative or executive acts that themselves 
allegedly constitute takings.
106
  These “aiding and abetting” scenarios tangle 
together two questions: 1) what forum(s) should hear the challenge to the 
initial governmental act?  and 2) do the effects of the court’s decision, 
above and beyond ratifying the underlying act of the nonjudicial actor, 
constitute a taking?
107
  The first question implicates procedural issues that I 
will not address here,
108
 while the second question can be analyzed as if it 
were the product of a stand-alone judicial decision.     
Second, my goal in this Part, as in the piece as a whole, is analytic 
rather than normative.  I show how limits on a judicial takings doctrine 
might be formulated in a way that would be consistent with existing taking 
doctrines. In so doing, I mean neither to endorse those existing doctrines 
nor advocate any particular way of accommodating judicial takings doctrine 
to them.  Instead, I mean to present some underexplored limiting principles 
that could render the doctrine more tractable, if that result were desired. 
Whether or not any judicial takings doctrine should be pursued is another 
question, and one I do not take up here.
109
   
                                                 
105 See text accompanying notes  148-149, infra. 
106 There are also instances where a court’s failure to award just compensation combines with another 
governmental act to produce a taking.  Here, review of the just compensation awarded is available.  See Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).   
107 See Barros, supra note 2, at 958 (explaining that this set of cases cannot be completely dispensed with by 
addressing the legislative or executive taking if the court also influenced property rights with its pronouncement).  
It is the marginal effect of the judicial action, however, that should be of interest, since the underlying nonjudicial 
act can be treated on its own.   
108 For discussion of  procedural issues as they relate to judicial takings, see, for example, Barros, supra note 
2, at 943-53 
109 Nonetheless, the analysis here does bear on that question in the following way:  the easier it is to create a 
manageable judicial takings doctrine, the harder it is to rule out the possibility on prudential grounds, and, 
conversely, the more convoluted the conceptual and doctrinal twists are required to make such a doctrine 
plausible, the harder the case for recognizing it becomes.  I will leave it to the reader to decide whether what 
follows makes a judicial takings doctrine look more or less viable.   
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A.  Two Boundaries, Again 
 
Consider again the two contested boundaries set out in Slide 8: the 
public use line and the regulatory takings line.  Thinking about how each of 
these boundaries maps onto the judicial takings context raises important 
issues of institutional competence.
110
   
 
1. Adapting The Public Use Line 
 
The public use line, as framed above, separates the realm of legitimate 
government takings with just compensation (the pay zone) from due process 
violations that flunk the rational basis means-ends test (the no-go zone).  In 
the nonjudicial context, this line is outfitted with a door through which 
governmental actors consciously enter on the understanding that they must 
pay. An important initial question is whether judges have access to this 
same door.   
The fact courts that have no purse might suggest a negative answer,
111
 
for two reasons. First, just as it would violate our society’s transaction 
structure
112
 to enter a restaurant and eat a meal if you knew, going in, that 
you had no means to pay, so too would it seem to be beyond the power of 
courts to consciously incur financial obligations that they have no 
wherewithal to meet. This is not a complete answer, however, because 
courts might order other parties to pay money.
113
  The real issue is whether 
courts have any legitimate basis on which to access those monies to fund 
their own takings. This brings us to a second reason for doubting the power 
of courts to undertake eminent domain, suggested by Justice Kennedy, in 
his Stop the Beach opinion:  that the political branches, not the courts, are 
the proper parties to decide when a taking “makes financial sense.”114  
                                                 
110 Other commentators have similarly focused on questions of institutional competence in considering the 
question of judicial takings.  See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 46, at 485-86 (discussing the role of “comparative 
institutional analysis” in considering judicial takings); Lehavi, supra note 2 (discussing institutional issues arising 
from conceptualizing judges both as “lawmakers” and as actors charged with reviewing the acts of others). 
111 Thompson discusses the related assumption by most courts and commentators “that the taking 
protections, if applied to the judiciary . . . would bar the judiciary from making any change constituting a taking. 
This is because the judiciary has no purse from which to pay compensation.”  Thompson, supra note 2, at 1499. 
112 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289, 
301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (discussing lawbreaking in terms of “transaction 
structures”). 
113 See Thompson, supra note 2 at 1513-14.  Whether their orders will be heeded or not is another matter. 
See id. at 1514 n. 250.  Thompson discusses some alternatives that would leave to the legislature the final decision 
about whether or not to pay.  Thompson, supra note 2, at 1513-21. Under one model (“automatic compensation”), 
payment is ordered unless the legislature overrides the change by statue, while under another (“legislative 
choice”), the change is made contingent on the legislature making the payment.  While the legislature could 
always reach out to ratify by statute and compensation a change that is deemed to be a judicial taking, these other 
mechanisms seem questionable.  Absent some express authorization from the legislature, courts’ adoption of these 
approaches would  seem to be ultra vires usurpations of the legislature’s power to set its own agenda.   
114 130 S.Ct. at 2614  (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
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Here it becomes helpful to think again about the public use door, and 
what it is meant to let in and screen out.  The basic test for public use is (or 
at least approximates) the same loose-fitting rational basis test that applies 
to exercises of the police power generally.
115
 Moreover, courts (at least in 
interpreting federal constitutional requirements) have told legislative and 
executive branch actors that they can largely decide when to let themselves 
in.  There are some limits, but the overall approach is highly deferential. 
This makes sense in the context of a means-ends test. Legislative and 
executive actors are thought to be institutionally competent to make 
judgments about how best to achieve legitimate ends in a way that courts 
are not.   
This does not mean, however, that courts are wholly disabled by 
principles of substantive due process from making means-ends judgments in 
the course of their work.
116
  We could hardly expect a court to decide what 
counts as possession  in a given context, or how an easement is established, 
or how privity requirements should apply, without resorting at some level to 
logical inferences about how the world works and what sorts of rules tend to 
produce what sorts of results.  Justice Kennedy’s invocation of the fiscal 
judgments that are implicated by the exercise of eminent domain offers a 
much more specific basis for limiting the court’s role.  John Echeverria 
expands on Kennedy’s point, arguing that “only the political branches are in 
a position to make the tradeoffs between potentially expensive takings and 
other public funding priorities” and citing “the virtually unique money-
mandating nature of the Takings Clause.”117       
Thus, courts appear institutionally ill-positioned to make the fiscally-
sensitive means-ends judgments that would give them access to the door to 
the pay zone. Judicial acts of condemnation might be regarded as due 
process violations in the following sense: the court is selecting property for 
condemnation, but lacks the budgetary and political data to enable it to 
coherently make the means-ends assessment that is demanded in such a 
case.
118
  If that assessment is correct, then the judicial takings version of the 
public use line lacks a door; conscious choices to enter the pay zone are 
impermissible.  The oval is instead bounded by institutional razor wire as 
                                                 
115 See supra note 16 and text accompanying notes 49-59, supra. 
116 A broad reading of Justice Kennedy’s invocation of the Due Process Clause as a limit on judicial 
authority in Stop the Beach might seem to tend in this direction, although Kennedy does emphasize the 
competence of courts to make incremental changes.  See Lehavi, supra note 2, at 19-22.  
117 Echeverria, supra note 46, at 487 (footnote omitted).  As Echiverria explains, this argument is premised 
on Kennedy’s view “that exercises of the eminent domain power  necessarily entail a government obligation to 
pay just compensation, a premise that Justice Scalia disputes.”  Id.  For the reasons elaborated in the text and 
images above, I agree with Kennedy’s premise.  However, it does not follow from the fact that an actor has an 
obligation to pay just compensation that compensation is the only available remedy when the obligation has been 
breached. See Part III.D.2, infra.   
118 See Echiverria, supra note 46, at 487. 
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shown in Slide 11.
119
    
 
Slide 11 
 
 
 
Judges might still try to engage in conscious appropriations of private 
property for public use in a manner akin to the exercise of eminent domain, 
but, on this account, those acts fall outside the realm of legitimacy as 
violations of due process.   
One challenge to that story runs as follows.  Unless there is some 
federal limit on state separation of powers that would rule out courts’ use of 
the condemnation power even if state law delegated it to them,
120
 it would 
appear that state law (that is, its failure to make such a delegation) is the 
only thing that makes the court’s act of condemnation impermissible.  It 
might then seem to follow that a given condemnation could be both a 
compensable taking (properly within the pay zone as a matter of federal 
law) and a prohibited act under state law.
121
  Yet here, as above,
122
 it makes 
sense to limit what will count as “public use” for federal purposes to public 
                                                 
119 I do not mean to suggest that judges are more strictly excluded from paying for improper acts, as opposed 
to just engaging in them for free. The razor wire merely conveys that a boundary that is permeable by a legislature 
is not for a court.   
120 Clearly, it would be inconsistent with the Takings Clause for a legislature to get the judiciary to do 
condemnations on its behalf without paying just compensation.  See, e.g., Dogan  & Young, supra note 101, at 
110 (“If a state could avoid paying just compensation by transferring its condemnation authority to the courts, that 
would invite a fairly obvious end run around the Takings Clause.”). A different question is whether there would 
be any federal constitutional constraint on a legislature delegating to a court the power to condemn along with a 
commitment to pay for any takings that the court decides are necessary. In Stop the Beach, Justice Scalia indicates 
no such constraint exists, contrary to the suggestion implicit in some of Justice Kennedy’s comments.   
121 See Somin, supra note 62 at 97.  Somin’s argument differs subtly from the one in the text insofar as he 
does not view compensation as the only remedy.  See id.   
122 This is another incarnation of the issue flagged earlier in connection with more stringent state public use 
requirements.  See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.  
34 Fennell [15-Mar-12 
uses that are defined as such by state law.
123
  The due process requirement 
that a public purpose be pursued must also implicitly require that it be a 
purpose of, and pursued by, an authorized state actor using authorized state 
means.
124
  Thus, whether or not one thinks that a state could constitutionally 
delegate condemnation authority to a court, the fact that no such authority 
has in fact been delegated would seem to preclude purposeful access to the 
pay zone as a matter of federal law.
125
 
How then should we think about a situation in which a court grants an 
expanded easement for public beach access—an act that might seem to take 
private property for public use?
126
 One response is that it would be highly 
unusual for a court to announce that it has decided on its own, without any 
law on its side, to take property away from one party to give to the 
public.
127
 Rather, the decision will be couched as a vindication or 
rediscovery of pre-existing rights vouchsafed to the public, to which the 
private parties’ claims were always really subordinate (even if this fact 
somehow escaped the notice of courts for quite some time).
128
 It is fair to 
worry that courts may disingenuously invoke past rights,
129
 but the upshot 
of their doing so is not a free pass. For one thing, there may be reputational 
constraints against handing down a decision that is plainly based on a 
misreading of precedent or misapplication of longstanding common law 
principles.  Nor is a judge necessarily off the hook as far as judicial takings 
are concerned merely because she frames the decision in a way that takes it 
out of the mold of conscious takings for public use.
130
  There is yet another 
                                                 
123 See Zinn, supra note 42, at 249 & n.24 (arguing that “unauthorized agency actions by definition do not 
advance public uses” and noting that the Court’s statement in First English that Takings Clause analysis is limited 
to “otherwise proper” government actions) (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 315).   
124 See Echiverria, supra note 117, at 485 (discussing the possibility “that judicial takings would be ultra 
vires, and not the acts of government at all”);  Zinn, supra note 42, at 286 (“Where a regulatory action lacks 
legislative authorization, the legislature cannot be said to have approved the action's purpose as public.”). 
Presumably no one would think it would be a compensable taking under federal law if a private party (call her 
Robin Hood) commandeers another individual’s chattel property and uses the proceeds to pursue what she 
personally believes to be a public purpose. There seems to be no basis on which to distinguish the case in which 
the court acts outside of the authority vested in it by state law.    
125 There is authority for the proposition that the legislature cannot evade the compensation requirement of 
the Takings Clause by authorizing actions that amount to takings by statute and formally withholding 
condemnation power.  See Zinn, supra note 42, at 245 n.4. The situation that state courts are in is quite distinct, 
however, assuming they have been given no authority whatever to engage in eminent domain.  Nonetheless, this 
argument does help explain why courts might be capable of committing non-eminent domain takings in the course 
of carrying out their authorized judicial duties.  See text accompanying note 135  infra. 
126 Beach access examples are prevalent in the literature on judicial takings, as well as in the case law to 
date.  See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1501 (“many of the cases that have been challenged as judicial takings over 
the last decade have expanded public access to, or called for preservation of, unique resources such as beaches and 
waterways”).   
127  See infra Part III.B (discussing the sorts of circumstances that might lead to such a pronouncement).      
128 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1478 (“Courts seldom confess to changing the law, claiming instead to 
clarify, integrate, or correct prior precedents.” (fn omitted)). 
129 Justice Scalia worried in Lucas that giving a pass to all harm-prevention efforts would test only whether a 
legislature had “a stupid staff.” 505 U.S. at 1025 n. 12.  An analogous “stupid law clerk” argument might apply 
here, were it not for the fact that other checks on judicial behavior exist, as explained in the text.   
130 There is a general rule that a state supreme court’s interpretation of state law is not reviewable by a 
federal court.  See [Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)] cited and discussed in Dogan & 
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boundary to consider. 
 
2. Adapting The Regulatory Takings Line 
 
The regulatory takings line in the nonjudicial model separates ordinary 
exercises of the police power that do not require compensation (the free 
zone), from regulatory takings requiring compensation (the pay zone).  
What does this line denote in the judicial takings context?  Justice Holmes’s 
concern that government be allowed to “go on” applies equally in this 
context, and offers some basic guidance in locating the line. Of course, what 
it means for government to “go on” means something different when we are 
talking about a judicial actor than when we are talking about a legislative or 
administrative body.  
As a conceptual matter, the line that separates compensable judicial 
takings from ordinary judicial activity depends in significant part on what it 
means to carry out the ordinary work of adjudicating property disputes in a 
common law system.
131
  Although property tends to be highly inertial, it is 
also a creature of the common law, and hence subject to processes of 
growth and evolution.  Property owners know that their holdings may 
change in a variety of ways as law changes, and they are compensated in 
kind for this by the benefits of a property system that is capable of adapting 
to new circumstances and conditions.
132
 This does not seem particularly 
controversial—nearly everyone would agree that a certain amount of 
change and adaptation is part of the overall property bargain.  But how 
much change, how quickly, and with what kinds of effects?  
The answers will depend on one’s conception of property, as Barton 
Thompson emphasized in his classic exploration of judicial takings.
133
 An 
initial and fundamental question is how to establish the baseline from which 
to measure change. If the baseline can always be moved (or, rather, can be 
                                                                                                                            
Young, supra note 101, at 119-21.  But an exception applies: “where a state law ruling serves as an antecedent for 
determining whether a federal right has been violated, some review of the basis for the state court’s determination 
of the state-law question is essential if the federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination.” Id. 
at 121 (quoting [RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 458 (6th ed. 2009)]).  My focus here is on state courts as potential “takers,” although the Stop 
the Beach plurality’s reasoning would seemingly extend to federal courts as well.  See, e.g.,  Echeverria, supra 
note 46, at 486; Dogan & Young, supra note 101, at 130-133. 
131 Scholars have expressed concern that “the everyday business of common-law courts” could be subject to 
takings challenges.  Dogan & Young, supra note 101, at 113. Cf. Merrill, supra note 86, at 424-28 (describing a 
“boundary maintenance” approach to regulatory takings that examines both how much a given regulatory act 
resembles eminent domain and how much it resembles an exercise of the police power). 
132 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 195-215 (discussing in-kind compensation); Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165, 1219-24 (1967) (applying a Rawlsian analysis to just compensation questions).  We also have a 
federal system that enables state courts to learn from and offer guidance to each other (just as state legislators or 
agencies might), and the prospects for adoption, adaptation, and experimentation that this entails are also arguably 
an important part of what it means to own property in the United States. 
133 Thompson, supra note 2, at 1522-41.   
36 Fennell [15-Mar-12 
found to have “always” been in another place), it is hard see how anything 
can be “taken.” Thus, a purely positivist approach in which property law 
aligns with whatever the state courts have to say on the matter would 
suggest a virtually nonexistent role for the judicial takings doctrine.
134
  The 
absence of a judicial takings doctrine would not leave courts free to do 
anything they wanted with respect to property law.  Limits, however, would 
emanate from sources of law other than the Takings Clause.  For example, 
due process independently prohibits courts from consciously undertaking an 
act that is the functional equivalent of eminent domain, for the reasons 
already given. Similarly, bribery and corruption would be policed 
independently of any judicial takings doctrine, since such acts would never 
be for public use under any interpretation.   
If judicial takings are in fact a null set, then the universe of judicial acts 
looks like Slide 12.  
 
Slide 12 
 
 
 
 
 If we rule out (for present expositional purposes) the possibility that 
judicial takings are nonexistent, then the task remains of locating the line 
between ordinary exercises of the judicial power and compensable judicial 
takings. This judicial takings line is shown in Slide 13.   
                                                 
134 See id. at 1531-35.    
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Slide 13 
 
 
 
Even if one believes that many of the ways in which courts might violate 
the rights of property owners would fall under some other constitutional 
rubric, such as substantive due process, the judicial takings line must still be 
addressed unless judicial takings is deemed to be a null set.  No matter how 
much scholarly energy is poured into determining the line between 
legitimate and impermissible government acts (what we might think of as 
the “edge of oval” inquiry), we still must contend with the line between 
compensable legitimate acts and noncompensable ones.   
Two preliminary points about this line require attention. First is the 
question whether it is even possible for courts to cross over into the “pay 
zone,” given their lack of budgets to pay for takings.  When reached from 
the business-as-usual side, the pay zone represents only a “must pay” zone 
rather than one in which payment has already been rendered, as discussed 
above.  This is not a satisfying answer, however, if courts would never be 
able to provide compensation under any circumstances.  If we are going to 
rule out judicial exercises of eminent domain on the grounds that courts 
cannot pay, why not these sorts of judicial takings as well? One distinction 
is that judicial exercises of eminent domain fail for a second reason, that of 
falling outside courts’ institutional role as defined by state law, while the 
adjudicative work that might “go too far” falls well within that role.135  In 
addition, although courts cannot access funding for condemnations, they do 
have access to various forms of in-kind compensation and other tools 
                                                 
135 See text accompanying notes 120-125, supra. 
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through which parties to disputes can be made to compensate each other.  
These alternatives might be employed in cases where inadvertent lapses into 
the pay zone occur while courts are carrying out their ordinary work.
136
 
Second, more important than the location of the line is the question of 
who will police it, and with what level of scrutiny or deference.  I suggested 
above that courts engage in fairly complex and active management of the 
regulatory takings line, and show a willingness to expend significant 
judicial resources to determine on which side of a given line a particular act 
lies. This I attributed to their institutional competence in evaluating the 
effects of background principles and the burdens that restrictions on 
property will impose.  Those same points hold true where courts must 
evaluate their own conduct relative to the judicial takings line. Courts 
presumably know how to identify and apply background principles, and 
how to manage incremental change from existing baselines in ways that do 
not impose inordinate burdens.
137
 In short, courts might be thought 
institutionally well-equipped to make sure that their own decisions do not 
go “too far.”  Accepting this principle would not mean that there would be 
no federal constitutional check on the actions of state courts, but it does 
suggest that the review would be highly deferential.
138
  
It might initially seem odd to entrust the same actor whose actions are 
governed by a given line with the task of policing it.  But this is just what is 
done with respect to the public use line.  The Supreme Court has shown 
itself willing to defer to judgments by legislative and executive actors about 
what counts as public use, with relatively minimal limits, again based on 
assessments of institutional competence.  If legislative and administrative 
bodies are largely free to self-certify that their acts fall within public use in 
cases of eminent domain, it seems no more anomalous to allow courts to 
largely determine for themselves whether their acts are on the 
noncompensable or compensable side of the line.
139
  The fact that courts do 
not have resources of their own with which to pay compensation only 
strengthens this point.  Even though courts will wish to avoid a finding that 
their acts amounted to judicial takings for other reasons (like the desire to 
                                                 
136 I will have more to say about this later.  See infra Part III.D.2. 
137 See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 101, at 115 (“Because they generally act incrementally and in the 
context of specific factual disputes, we think courts bring particular institutional advantages to the process of legal 
change.”) (footnote omitted).   
138 It is true that any institutional advantages attributed to courts in general would apply to the reviewing 
court as well as to the court initially making the decision that allegedly committed a taking.  Here, however, 
principles of federalism play a role, given the general authority state courts  have to determine the content of state 
property law, as well as the greater familiarity that state courts will have with their own state law.  For further 
discussion of the federalism implications of judicial takings law, see, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 101; Ruda, 
supra note 101, at 456-58.   
139 Similar in spirit is the possibility Thompson discusses of allowing for a judicial takings concept for 
“exhortative or pedagogical purposes” without having federal courts undertake active review of state court 
decisions.  Thompson, supra note 2, at 1496. 
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avoid being reversed),
140
 the fact that they do not have revenue and payment 
streams to manage would arguably reduce any temptation to substitute 
“free” inputs for purchased ones.141    
 
B.  Confiscatory Nontakings Revisited 
 
Suppose we accept the premise above that courts are left largely free to 
self-police the judicial takings line but are deemed institutionally unable to 
engage in condemnations for public use. How, then, might we approach 
instances in which a court declares outright that it is changing the law in a 
way that represents a sharp break from the past and that seems to impose 
inordinate burdens on some property owners?   
Imagine, for example, that a court in a northern state declares that, 
although property law in the state has always allowed owners to keep 
hunters off their land, this rule must be updated to permit those hunting 
polar bears to enter the lands of others without liability.  Polar bears, it turns 
out, have become a scourge in the area after being displaced from their 
native habitat due to global warming, and the hungry, disgruntled bears are 
creating a grave threat to the population.  We can also specify that the bears 
are not distributed randomly in the state but instead have particular “attack 
zones” that have been well mapped out by local authorities, so that an 
identifiable two percent of property owners are affected.   
One possibility is that this is that rare entity, a judicial taking.  But 
another possibility should also be considered, reasoning by analogy to the 
categories of confiscatory nontakings that already exist in takings doctrine.  
Even acts that appropriate or destroy property may not count as takings 
under certain sets of circumstances, and an exigency like the one specified 
may well qualify for reasons like those that permit tearing down houses to 
stop fires or damaging convenience stores to apprehend criminals.
142
  If the 
                                                 
140 See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 26 (discussing the possibility that that courts would incur 
“reputational costs” of a reversal if a judicial taking were found, and possibly even “a greater stigma” associated 
with the takings finding itself).   
141 This is a concern with ordinary takings, and it forms an efficiency justification for just compensation.  
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW [58] (7th ed. 2007) (observing that “government 
would have an incentive to substitute land for other inputs that were cheaper to society as a whole but more 
expensive to the government” were it not for the “just compensation” requirement). Of course, even legislative 
and executive actors do not literally pay out of their own pockets; they have access to revenues raised coercively 
through taxation. It is questionable how closely the political price that they pay to engage in compensated takings 
corresponds to the amount of the compensation itself.  See Levinson, supra note 11, at 348; Daryl J. Levinson, 
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 969-71 (2005).  But whatever 
checks just compensation does place on political actors are surely blunted for judicial actors.  See, e.g., Peñalver 
& Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 26 (observing that Levinson’s argument about the potential inefficacy of just 
compensation “carries even more force as far as the judiciary is concerned”); Echeverria, supra note 46, at 
491(“since the judicial branch would neither be directly involved in paying takings awards, nor responsible to 
those who would have to pay such awards, it is problematic to conceive of takings liability as imposing a useful 
restraint on judicial decision-making”). 
142 Another way to address the issue would be to characterize it as consistent with existing state property law 
insofar as there are overarching doctrines of necessity that are only being applied to a new setting.   
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animating principle is to avoid singling out some property owners for undue 
burdens,
143
 then the nonrandom nature of the property affected might 
present a problem, although perhaps not if the court were to state its 
principle more broadly to encompass the pursuit of any marauding beasts, 
whether the polar bears that are creating the current crisis, or other 
threatening animals that may present similar crises in the future.  Yet 
another response would rely on in-kind compensation or average reciprocity 
of advantage to argue that the bear-rich areas are not only more heavily 
burdened by trespasses by bear hunters, they are more greatly benefited as 
well. 
What about a less dramatic case involving beachfront property? 
Suppose that a court simply states outright that henceforth a new policy is in 
effect:  Although history and precedent running as far back as the memory 
of humankind has given the public only the portion of the beach up to the 
mean high tide line, the public may now access an additional 100 landward 
feet of beach.  Such forthrightness of purpose is likely to be occasioned by 
some pressing need—if not a public emergency, then some seismic shift in 
the resources that people need for survival, or some other broad societal 
change that calls for a realignment of property rights. Suppose, for example, 
that the water had become too polluted in an area for anyone to enter, so 
that getting access to the mean high tide line was not enough to allow 
anyone to really enjoy the beach.  Yet the result may be to single out an 
identifiable class of the population (owners of beachfront property) and 
force them to contribute to the good of the populace as a whole.   
The court may be deemed to  have significant latitude to administer the 
public trust doctrine, just as there is great latitude where it comes to 
navigational servitudes, but it is not unimaginable that some acts would still 
go too far.  The fact that forfeitures that comply with due process 
requirements are not deemed takings also muddies the waters in a more 
global sense by suggesting that, in some contexts, the provision of 
procedural due process pulls a given act out of the takings realm altogether.   
These issues are complex ones that I cannot resolve here, but the well-
established fact that not all acts that look and feel like appropriations 
actually count as takings is important to keep in mind in thinking about 
judicial takings line.  Slide 14 brings back the confiscatory nontakings 
corner of Slide 7’s triangle of outright appropriation.  As already suggested, 
courts cannot (legitimately) undertake condemnations; hence the eminent 
domain portion of the triangle does not show up in the judicial edition of 
this image.  But, like their nonjudicial counterparts, courts can engage in a 
                                                 
143 See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-48 (1991); see also 
Michelman, supra note 132, at 1217 (distinguishing “randomly generated” losses from those that are strategic 
impositions of a “self-determining and purposive” majority);Thompson, supra note 2, at 1477-78 (citing and 
discussing Michelman on this point). 
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variety of noncompensable acts that do result in the appropriation or 
destruction of property.   
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C.  Zone Four? 
 
Anyone who has spent a great deal of time with Calabresi and 
Melamed’s classic Cathedral article will be unable to look at the three 
zones depicted in the takings diagrams (the “free zone,” the “pay zone,” and 
the “no-go zone”) without asking the question: isn’t there a fourth zone?  
Calabresi and Melamed developed their famous four-rule scheme in the 
context of a private nuisance dispute between a factory and a homeowner, 
which a court could resolve in any of four ways: by granting the entitlement 
to the homeowner and protecting it with a property rule (Rule 1, injunctive 
relief); by granting the entitlement to the homeowner and protecting it with 
a liability rule (Rule 2, damages); by granting the entitlement to the factory 
and protecting it with a property rule (Rule 3, no relief); or, innovatively, by 
granting the entitlement to the factory and protecting it with a liability rule 
(Rule 4, compensated injunction).   
With respect to governmental takings, the “no-go zone” would seem to 
correspond to Rule 1; these takings can be enjoined altogether, and are not 
validated by payment. The “pay zone” looks like Rule 2, with the just 
compensation rule operating like liability rule protection for the property 
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owner.
144
 Actions the government can undertake for free fit with a Rule 3 
regime; the property owner gets no relief.
145
  Rule 4 in this context would 
work something like this: the owner could unilaterally get the government 
not to appropriate the property by making a specified payment.
146
 
The possibility that property owners could pay the government not to 
take their property has surfaced in the law and economics literature in the 
context of discussing how inefficient takings might be avoided.
147
  The 
concern is that governmental entities might strategically threaten to take in 
order to collect payments.  The same or a different governmental entity 
might even threaten to take repeatedly from the same owner.
148
  An owner, 
foreseeing this, would never bother paying the government not to take, 
removing whatever Coasean check the ability to bargain over the taking 
might otherwise have added.
149
  It is generally assumed that the problem 
cannot be overcome because there is no way for political actors to bind 
future decisionmakers, and hence no way to make the kind of permanent 
bargain that would immunize property from a later taking—or a later 
threatened taking.
150
  Even if such a binding bargain could be made, the 
                                                 
144 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1108 (observing that “eminent domain is simply one of 
numerous instances in which society uses liability rules”). 
145 Property rule protection is not entirely accurate here. Insofar as the property owner cannot freely bargain 
with the government to keep it from regulating, a type of inalienability rule applies. 
146 The canonical Rule 4 describes a situation in which the party engaging in a particular activity has an 
entitlement to continue it, but the entitlement is only protected by a liability rule, and the other party may pay to 
remove it.  In the present context, the activity in question is some form of government appropriation.  If this 
appropriation would itself amount to a “taking” the government would be able to undertake it only upon the 
payment of compensation.  The entitlement in question, then, which the private owner would be buying out, will 
typically be a compound entitlement to take and pay.  Where the appropriation or regulation in question would not 
otherwise amount to a taking, a more ubiquitous form of Rule 4 applies that would cover a wide range of user 
fees, tradable permits, and so on, that allow a private owner to make a payment to avoid some form of unfavorable 
government action.  My focus in the text is on applications of Rule 4 to acts that would otherwise be takings, but it 
is worth noting that Rule 4 could be construed much more broadly, and in ways that are applicable to acts of the 
political branches.  I thank Eric Biber and Saul Levmore for discussions on this point. 
147 See  Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POLIT. ECON. 473, 480 (1976) 
(explaining that under conditions of zero transaction costs, eminent domain would produce optimal results 
because a landowner who valued the property above the expected court award could “offer the buyer the 
difference to prevent the taking of the parcel”); Benjamin E. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J. L 
Econ. & Org. 64, 72-73 (1995) (presenting a “buy-back rule” in which an owner retains the property only “if she 
pays the state the social benefit,” and stating that this will achieve the first-best outcome if the government is 
benevolent); see also THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EMINENT DOMAIN: PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
PUBLIC USE 93-96 (2011) (discussing Hermalin’s buy-back rule work).   
148 See William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic 
Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 278 n.19 (1988) (mentioning “landowners’ 
anticipation that their property may be retaken once they repurchase their rights” as a possible impediment to 
payments to avoid takings).   
149 This connects to a larger problem of multiple takings that has been identified with liability rule 
protection.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) [but see Bar-Gill (disputing this line of argument)].  
150 A bonding mechanism or escrow fund that would guarantee money back upon a later threatened retaking 
might be used to address this issue. More generally, the difficulty the government has keeping commitments is 
matched by entrenchment devices that make it harder for the government to later change its mind, and these can 
devices can support certain kinds of durable deals.  See generally Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment 
Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942842. 
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problem of excessive initial takings threats would remain.
151
   
Applying a Rule 4 approach in the judicial context, however, might 
present fewer worries, for reasons that can best be appreciated by 
considering an example.   Imagine an adverse possession dispute involving 
a possessor who unwittingly installed a flight of steps that encroached 
trivially on a neighbor’s land.152 Suppose that existing law in the 
jurisdiction makes state of mind irrelevant to an adverse possession claim, 
and that all other elements of adverse possession are clearly met—it is a 
slam dunk case in the possessor-stairbuilder’s favor under settled law.  The 
court, however, decides to add a “bad faith” requirement to its adverse 
possession rubric, something that has never before been required in that 
jurisdiction.
153
 Because this possessor’s encroachment was accidental, he 
does not meet the new requirement; the court therefore rules in favor of the 
record owner.  The possessor might then try to argue that the strip of land 
upon which it had encroached has been judicially taken from it by this new 
requirement.   
We have already seen that the court has some good responses to this 
claim, including the fact that the common law must be able to evolve, and 
that everyone benefits when property law is nimble enough to respond to 
societal changes and new conditions. That this is not a compensable taking 
is probably already overdetermined.  But if there were doubt on that point, 
consider the following: in ruling for the record owner, the court need not, 
and in fact probably would not, grant injunctive relief to the record owner 
and force the innocent encroacher to destroy his improvements.  Rather, a 
liability rule solution would be most likely, one in which the court allows 
the possessor to forcibly buy the encroached-upon land.  Normally we 
would think of this remedy as a garden variety application of Rule 2; the 
encroacher can pay and stay.  But when put into the context of an alleged 
judicial taking, it offers something more: the ability of the party alleging a 
taking to keep any physical taking from occurring by making a payment.  
From this perspective, the remedy looks something like Rule 4.
154
    
To be sure, the party who must make a payment just to hang onto what 
he thought was his is still losing something. But, interestingly, offering the 
                                                 
151 It might be possible to successfully construct a limited form of “pay not to take” through the use of an 
auction mechanism to select parcels within a designated redevelopment area, where not all parcels are necessary 
to the project.   [Robert Hammond, working paper; see also Weyl & Kominer]. 
152 Adverse possession is another standard factual template employed in judicial takings literature; the facts 
here resemble those in Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969).      
153 Such a standard would allow an adverse possessor to gain title only if she were aware that the land she 
was occupying was not her own.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass:  The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse 
Possession,  NW. U. L. REV. (2006).   
154 Carol Rose has suggested instead that eminent domain itself maps onto Rule 4.  Rose, supra note 5, at 
2180-81.  The mirror-image quality of the Calabresi & Melamed taxonomy makes this interpretation equally valid 
as the one in the text; in that case, however, there would still be a shadow Rule 2 in which the would-be 
condemnee (who is made to stop the use upon the government’s payment) would himself be able to continue the 
use (that is stop the condemnation) upon paying.   
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option to pay may alter the doctrinal consequences.  Recall that in the 
context of nonjudicial takings, significant diminutions in value are often 
considered perfectly consistent with noncompensable governmental actions.  
The law treats a physical encroachment (or something that might as well be 
one) differently from a mere decrease in value.
155
  Similarly, taxes are 
treated much differently from takings,
156
 and user fees, impact fees, and 
other payments are often collected without triggering a compensation 
requirement. Thus, there is reason to think that the “pay not to take” Rule 4 
regime I describe here would frequently fall on the noncompensable side of 
the line. 
This is not to suggest that takings law would be friendly to legislative or 
executive actors who threatened takings and then agreed to halt the 
condemnation upon payment.
157
 In those settings, something more than a 
mere financial burden is at issue—the concern that the burden is being 
manufactured for its own sake, to effect a transfer payment.  But courts 
have no independent ability to reach out and burden citizens by threatening 
to take things from them if they do not pay.  Moreover, when property 
owners do pay to avoid some injunctive result, the court has access to tools 
that enable it to make that deal stick.  For example, in Boomer, the court 
explained that if the factory paid permanent damages, the injunction would 
be lifted and replaced by a servitude on the neighbors’ land that would 
preclude them from bringing additional actions based on the factory’s 
operations. That servitude would run with the land and provide lasting 
protection for the factory for as long as it chose to operate.
158
 Courts cannot 
keep other plaintiffs from complaining about effects on them that were not 
                                                 
155 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds.) (2d. ed. 2008) (“It is important to note that it is 
the physical use and condition of a good that are protected from the action of others [by private property rights], 
not its exchange value.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 955, 957-59 (1993) (criticizing the distinction takings law 
draws between physical impositions and reductions in value).   
156 See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Taxing/Taking Taxonomy, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2010).   
157 Although not directly on point, the Court’s approach in the Nollan and Dolan decisions suggests that 
concerns about strategic governmental behavior loom large.  Those cases differ from the Rule 4 cases I am 
discusssing in the text in that the governmental restriction to be lifted was not one that would itself amount to a 
taking; rather it was in each case assumed to be a legitimate exercise of the police power that would not require 
compensation.  The “takings” angle in these cases stemmed instead from the concession that the landowners were 
asked to give up in order to get the regulation lifted. Because this concession would have been a taking if carried 
out independent of the regulatory change, the Court held that it could not be required unless it met standards of 
nexus and proportionality.  Nonetheless, statements in Lingle that suggest Nollan and Dolan may be limited to 
physical exactions (as opposed to monetary impact fees) would be consistent with my textual distinction between 
monetary and in-kind losses.   
158 To be sure, this protection takes the form of a property interest that could itself be extinguished through 
later legislative or judicial action.  For example, a new legislative scheme might give Atlantic Cement’s neighbors 
the right to sue for damages regardless of any contrary servitudes burdening their land.  That extinguishing act 
could in turn be the subject of a takings claim.  Whether or not that claim is successful, it would not create a 
situation in which the factory would be asked to repurchase an entitlement to impose impacts on its neighbors.  If 
it is legally possible for such a servitude to burden the neighbors’ property, the factory would already own it under 
principles of property law and res judicata; if such a servitude is no longer legally possible, the factory would not 
be in a position to repurchase it (and might be entitled to compensation for losing it). 
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treated in an earlier case, but those additional complaints would again not 
have the character of strategic governmental behavior.   
Zone 4, then, can be designated a “reverse payment zone,” one in which 
a court’s initial act must be lifted upon a payment flowing from, and not to, 
the affected property owner. Whereas the traditional Rule 4 relief is a 
compensated injunction, in this context, we would have a compensated non-
injunction. Without the reverse payment feature, acts in this zone would be 
judicial takings. The deciding court can voluntarily provide a reverse 
payment feature and largely immunize the act against a takings claim, or a 
reviewing court can find that the act falls within the reverse payment zone 
and apply that feature itself.     
This approach would again shrink the operative range of judicial takings 
by enabling a different way to validate acts that go over what would 
otherwise be the judicial takings line.  The results are shown in Slide 15.   
 
Slide 15 
 
 
 
 
D.  The Not-Quite-Null Set 
 
I have explained above how judicial takings, conditional on being 
recognized at all, could plausibly become nearly a null set.  Institutional 
competence considerations argue for a largely self-policing judicial takings 
line, and the category of judicial takings is further reduced to the extent that 
categories of confiscatory nontakings are recognized. Recognizing a fourth 
category, the “reverse payment zone,” offers further opportunities for 
limiting any judicial takings doctrine.  Shrinking the class of potential 
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challenges could make the doctrine more a curiosity than a threat to states’ 
authority to determine their own property law.  Nearly null is not the same 
as null, however, and the many questions that have been raised about 
judicial takings—procedural, remedial, conceptual—would continue to 
trouble courts and engage commentators.  Although I cannot delve into all 
of these issues here, it is appropriate to follow up the discussion of limits 
with some brief comments about how courts may nonetheless land in the 
pay zone, and what can be done about it. 
 
1. What’s Left? 
 
My goal in this essay has been to isolate questions rather than provide 
answers, but readers will understandably wonder what remains in the 
category of judicial takings after all the limits above are applied.  It cannot 
just be limits all the way down.  Other work on judicial takings has 
articulated underlying visions of property that either cabin what courts can 
ultimately do,
159
 or, alternatively, suggest that certain restrictions are 
anathema.
160
  Another possibility is an expectations-based approach that 
might assess how drastic or surprising are particular judicial changes, 
although it cannot be expectations all the way down, either.
161
   
A different way to pour content into the judicial takings doctrine would 
focus on instances in which the court’s decision works a transformation of 
an owner’s discrete property interest through aggregation.  While regulatory 
takings analysis to date has focused primarily on what has been taken and 
much less on what has been done with it,
162
 political branch takings are 
almost invariably associated with reconfiguring sets of rights into larger and 
more valuable configurations.
163
 Eminent domain can generate an assembly 
surplus explicitly by combining parcels of land.  In the regulatory arena, 
different kinds of regulatory assemblages can be achieved, like getting 
everyone in the neighborhood access to cable television, or saving an 
ecologically sensitive area. Because (legitimate) nonjudicial takings are 
invariably in service of some larger goal, that part of the story rarely 
receives attention.  Instead, attention turns to other matters, such as whether 
the thing taken represents a “discrete twig” that would be both easy to settle 
                                                 
159 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between The Ius 
Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011). 
160 See, e.g.., J. Peter Byrne, Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality! ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2011) draft 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/631 
161 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 1538-41; see also Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at 1110 (noting “the 
seemingly patent circularity of a court’s distinguishing among property rights on the basis of reasonable 
expectations about their continuation”).   
162 A notable exception is Rubinfeld, supra note 20.   
163 There could also be disassembly surplus, if gains were achieved by dividing property among many 
owners.  Cf. Midkiff.   
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over and especially demoralizing for the owner to lose.
164
    
 Most adjudicated property disputes do involve a “discrete twig” (some 
particular disputed property interest), but the question is usually just “who 
owns the twig?”  Either way the case goes, it will remain a twig.  Assembly 
of many twigs to achieve a larger goal is rarer in the judicial context.  When 
it occurs, it is more likely to generate surpluses like those that political 
actors generate through their regulatory acts than is a decision that awards a 
twig to A over B in the course of resolving a dispute.
165
 On this account, a 
court that establishes a new easement across the property of many 
landowners to allow passage of large numbers of people would be doing 
something considerably different than a court that finds  party A has an 
easement across the land of party B solely in order to access B’s own land. 
The reason is not that “the public” or “the government” is involved in the 
first case.
166
 Although often there may be correlations along those lines, a 
court might also assemble a set of easements for the benefit of residents of a 
private neighborhood, or students of a private university.   
Treating such aggregative decisions as more likely candidates for 
judicial takings analysis dovetails with the twin goals of allowing courts to 
carry out their ordinary business without interference, while still keeping 
them from undertaking acts that, if undertaken by a political actor, would 
count as takings.  And it fits with the account of institutional competence 
that has been developed in this essay. Coupled with the limits that have 
been identified, judicial takings might be identified with surplus-generating 
reconfigurations of property rights, accomplished independent of 
background principles, not as a function of common law evolution, and 
without any rationale that would make it into a compensatory nontaking.  A 
rare animal indeed, but one we cannot rule out as a theoretical possibility.   
  
2. Remedies For the Purseless 
 
In the rare instances that a judicial taking were found, the purseless 
                                                 
164 Michelman, supra note 132, at 1233 (illustrating the idea of “distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, 
investment-backed expectations” by describing the right to continue an existing use as a “discrete twig”); id. at at 
1234 (setting out—and suggesting some uncertainty about—the assumptions required to reach the textual 
conclusion, notably “that deprivation of one of these mentally circumscribed things is an event attended by pain of 
a specially acute or demoralizing kind, as compared with what one experiences in response to the different kind of 
event consisting of a general decline in one's net worth”).  This idea of discrete investment-backed expectations 
forms part of the Penn Central test for regulatory takings that was reiterated in Lingle.  See supra note 23 and 
acompanying text.  
165This distinction resembles in some respects Joseph Sax’s distinction “between the role of government as 
participant and the government as mediator in the process of competition among economic claims.” Joseph L. 
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62 (1965). See also Carol Rose, Property and 
Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1 (distinguishing an intermediate 
type of property disruption that is bound up with social transition from lower-level “housekeeping” disruptions 
and from larger-scale expropriations that are based on denials of membership within a community).   
166 See, e.g., Barros, supra note __, at 906-09 (suggesting a distinction based on party identity).   
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court would not be able to make the taking good retroactively by paying for 
it, although the legislature could step in to do so.  With invalidation (or the 
application of a Rule 4 alternative) standing as the only institutionally 
appropriate responses, a lingering question involves the interim period 
between the initial decision that amounted to a taking and the invalidation 
or modification of that decision.  First English makes the interim period a 
compensable taking even if the act in question is abandoned after it is 
adjudged to be a taking.  An initial question is whether First English should 
even apply in the judicial context.  Despite the Stop the Beach plurality’s 
insistence that the identity of the governmental actor does not matter, the 
First English remedy may address a problem that is not implicated in the 
judicial context:  that an actor could engage in a series of regulatory takings 
with impunity by simply dropping or amending a given regulation upon 
losing a challenge.
167
 The reasoning here is similar to that raised above; 
courts are generally thought to lack the incentives that political actors 
arguably have to substitute unpaid inputs for paid ones in achieving public 
ends.   
If First English applies, however, we are faced with the specter of a 
constitutional wrong—the interim taking—without a remedy.  What to do, 
then, about a governmental actor that has a duty to pay but no means to 
pay?  In private law contexts, the problem of judgment-proof defendants 
can be addressed by requiring those engaging in conduct that may create 
liability to carry insurance or post bonds. Judicial takings insurance, 
perhaps funded by court fees, is not an institutional impossibility. But it 
would send an odd signal and could introduce moral hazard concerns by 
making property owners less prone to pursue takings claims promptly.
168
  
And it may be unnecessary.    
    Judicial decisions differ from other governmental actions in that they 
have identifiable winners and losers listed right in the case caption, whose 
resources are reachable through all manner of procedural means.
169
 Thus, it 
could well be workable to have the party who gains by (what turns out to 
                                                 
167 Justice Brennan raises this concern pointedly in his dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric v. City of San 
Diego when he quotes from remarks prepared by a California City Attorney for a National Institute of Municipal 
Law Officers conference in California:  “IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND 
START OVER AGAIN.”  450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22  (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting) [quoting Longtin, Avoiding 
and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse Condemnation), in 38B 
NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REV. 192-93 (1975) (emphasis in original)].      
168 Cf. Peñalver and Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 25-39 (raising concerns that litigants would underinvest in 
advocacy, to the detriment of property law, if compensation were available for certain kinds of judicially-
produced deprivations).  The just compensation requirement already operates as insurance, as has been well noted, 
and moral hazard concerns have been raised in other takings contexts.   See, e.g.,  Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 
148; Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation 
be Paid? 99 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984); see also Ellickson & Been, supra note 80, at 152-53 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing 
and collecting sources on the moral hazard problem associated with compensation). 
169 To be sure, neither the win nor the loss may be in cash.  But whatever just compensation bill may be 
accruing in the judicial takings context corresponds to a benefit someone is receiving.  
15-Mar-12] PICTURING TAKINGS 49 
be) a taking compensate the takee for the interim loss.
170
 The famously 
passive-voiced Takings Clause does not specify who must provide just 
compensation.  At least in simple cases with private parties on both sides, 
ensuring compensation could be as simple as adapting familiar procedural 
tools like stays of judgment and supersedeas bonds.
171
  I have just suggested 
that simple cases of this sort are not the likeliest candidates for judicial 
takings, but if a different vision of judicial takings carries the day, such 
mechanisms could become important.   
Suppose a property case involving an easement is resolved in favor of 
Winner and against Loser, with the result that Loser can no longer keep 
Winner from crossing her land.  If Loser can make out a plausible takings 
claim, then she could get a stay of the judgment until the takings claim is 
resolved, subject to any bonding requirements that may be necessary to 
protect Winner.
172
 Winner might then be given the opportunity to get 
immediate enforcement of the judgment by posting a bond that ensures he 
(Winner) would be able to pay just compensation for the property in the 
event it is found to be a taking. The details of this procedure could be 
constructed to promote the prompt and diligent pursuit of takings claims.
173
  
By letting Loser avoid the possibility of an uncompensated temporary 
taking and making Winner liable for any taking that in fact results, it would 
address the “wrong without a remedy” concerns associated with judicial 
takings. It would also remove any concern that Winner and Loser would 
collude in the initial property case, with Loser agreeing to take the loss and 
later seek compensation from the State.
174
   
Admittedly, the procedure would not work well in cases where a large 
                                                 
170 Peñalver and Strahilevitz similarly observe that a private party, rather than the government, might be the 
“most appropriate defendant” in a takings case.   Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2,  at 29 n.94  (suggesting 
that in most cases in which private party Paul wins property rights formerly held by private party Peter, “imposing 
liability on the state . . . makes less sense than drawing on Paul’s resources to make Peter whole”).  The procedure 
described in the text would do just that.  As Peñalver & Strahilevitz note, this point relates to scholarship on 
“givings”—the always-present flip side of takings. See, e.g., WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (Donald G. Hagman & 
Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 4-5 (1993); Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).  While usually benefits are not charged against the 
recipients, things look quite different when the recipient is a single, identifiable private party who has come 
looking for this benefit through a lawsuit.   
171 See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 62. 
172 The factors for a stay of an injunction mirror those for getting an injunction in the first place, including a 
showing of irreparable injury.  Because just compensation can make an individual legally whole in the 
constitutional sense, even if not in fact, it might seem that there could be no irreparable injury.  But this ignores 
the fact that the court would likely reverse a decision found to be a taking, so that the individual would be left 
with their property after having had it impaired for some period of time.  If property holdings comprise lumpy 
bundles that deliver value to people, a partial interference partially compensated may work a much graver injury 
in pro rata terms than would a full taking fully compensated.   
173 For example, the amount of the initial bond would be keyed to the length of suspension, which would in 
turn be keyed to the expected amount of time to diligently pursue a takings claim to resolution.   
174 See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 29-30 (outlining the potential for collusion where 
compensation for a taking is available). It is questionable whether collusion presents a significant worry in this 
context, much less one of sufficient uniqueness, insolubility, and magnitude to drive doctrine, but the approach in 
the text would alleviate such concerns to the extent they exist.   
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and diffuse public stands on one side and a small and cohesive set of 
property owners stands on the other. The ability for the public to come up 
with a bond may be limited by free rider problems and ordinary transaction 
costs.  Similar points might also be raised where one party simply lacks 
money.  If the party challenging the taking cannot raise a bond, it risks 
suffering an uncompensated loss if the decision is ultimately found to be a 
taking.
175
  Nor would off-the-rack stay or bonding approaches deal well 
with the claims of property owners who are affected by the court’s 
judgment but who are not parties to the initial lawsuit.
176
  Courts might, 
however, find ways to adapt existing procedural tools to try to address such 
cases.  Alternatively, the legislature could endorse a given judicial decision, 
putting itself on the hook for the potential interim payments, or, 
alternatively, override it.  If a further check were needed, a remedy for a 
judicial breach of the Just Compensation Clause could be a judicial bonding 
or insurance requirement, as discussed above.  My point in raising these 
possibilities is not to advocate for any particular model, but rather to show 
that there may well be ways for courts to satisfy the dictates of the pay zone 
on the rare instances their actions place them there.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current spotlight on judicial takings reveals conceptual ambiguities 
in takings law as a whole, and offers an opportunity for reexamining the 
relationships among different parts of the doctrinal framework.  This essay 
has tried to distill a coherent picture from what is, at best, an untidy set of 
doctrines. The exercise has involved some potentially controversial gap 
filling and reasoning by extension, as well as some departures from 
established doctrine.  Nonetheless, by mapping out one view of the takings 
terrain, I hope to have both nailed down points of consensus and isolated 
remaining disagreements and ambiguities in a way that will advance efforts 
to understand and contribute to takings doctrine.   
                                                 
175 We would need to know more about the ability of such parties to receive support from others interested in 
the case’s outcome who will enjoy positive spillovers if it goes in the challenger’s favor.   
176 See Barros, supra note 2, at 909 (distinguishing this factual scenario from a case brought by parties to the 
state court litigation in which the judicial taking allegedly occurred).   
